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THE IMPOSSIBLE, HIGHLY DESIRED
ISLAVIIC BANK
HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI*
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this Article is to explore, and explain the stubborn per-
sistence of a central paradox that is endemic to the retail Islamic bank as
it operates in the United States. The paradox is that retail Islamic banking
in the United States is impossible, and yet it remains highly desired. It is
impossible because central features of modern banking regulation conflict
with fundamental aspects of shari'a as it is understood in modernity in the
context offinance. It is unimaginable that regulators will create exceptions
to, or somehow significantly amend, the modern financial regulatory system
in the radical fashion necessary to accommodate Islamic finance. Yet not-
withstanding such impossibility, Islamic banking is also highly desired in
that there is a preoccupation with finding a way to enhance the very limited
Islamic commercial banking opportunities that exist in the United States.
The paradox endures because the Islamic bank, and the accommodation
of it within the U.S. regulatory sphere, is a powerful symbol for the accom-
modation of the broader, pious Muslim public. The pious Muslim eager to
see an Islamic bank open in her neighborhood is at best only partly interested
in adherence to religious doctrine. The Islamic bank is more importantly a
reflection of a broader recognition of her space in the American fabric.
* Haider Ala Hamoudi, Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Research
& Faculty Development, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I would like to thank
Timur Kuran, Mahmoud El-Gamal, Sh. Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo, Michael McMillen, Frank
Vogel, Mehmet Asutay, Jonathan Ercanbrack and Nicholas Foster for their generous com-
ments and support. Any errors are mine alone.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to explore, and explain the stubborn per-
sistence of, a central paradox that is endemic to the retail Islamic bank as
it operates in the United States. The paradox is that retail Islamic banking
in the United States is impossible, and yet it remains highly desired' The
reason for its persistence is that the desire to see Islamic banking expand in
the United States stems from the strong desire to accommodate Muslims in
the broader American fabric, and acknowledging its doctrinal impossibility
would seem directly contrary to that strong and salutary impulse. Hence, the
impossibility is ignored, and the paradox remains.
To be clear, I do not mean the bank is "impossible" in the sense that an
institution holding some sort of banking charter and claiming to be "Islamic"
could not possibly exist-some already do, albeit to a very limited extent.2 I
mean instead that an institution claiming to be an American Islamic retail
bank violates on a regular basis core aspects of shari 'a3 (at least as shari'a
1 See infra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
2 See infra Part II.E.
3 I use the term shari 'a herein to refer to the corpus of extensive, overlapping and oft-
conflicting rules developed by Muslim jurists, medieval and modem, from Islam's sacred
foundational texts, the Qur'an, as revealed word of God, and the Hadith, or statements,
utterances, and actions of the Prophet Muhammad. I am often intelligently and thought-
fully criticized for defining this vast and contradictory body of norms and rules developed
by medieval jurists as shari'a, rather thanfiqh. See, e.g., Patrick S. O'Donnell, Divine Law
(Shari'ah) and Jurisprudence (Fiqh) in Islam, RATIO JURIS: LAW, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY
(June 26, 2009, 10:58 AM), http://ratiojuris.blogspot.com/2009/06/divine-law-shariah-juris
prudence-fiqhhtml. It is true that the latter term is often used to describe the substantive rules
derived by jurists while the shari'a conveys a more idealistic sensibility. See FRANK E.
VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES, III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK AND RETURN
23-24 (1998) (distinguishing between shari'a as the immutable Divine Law and fiqh as
human efforts to capture that law through scholarly interpretation); Asifa Quraishi, What
if Shari'a Weren't the Enemy?: Rethinking International Women's Rights Advocacy on
Islamic Law, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 173, 203 (2011) (noting a similar distinction). The
problem is that if shari'a refers to nothing beyond a perfect and immutable Divine Law
separate and apart from any human effort to understand that law, then almost as a matter of
epistemological necessity it means precisely nothing that is of value to lawyers. Moreover,
if shari'a were truly divorced from human understanding of Divine Law, it would render
clauses like the one contained in Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution declaring "the princi-
ples of the shari'a" to be "the principal source of legislation" entirely baffling. CONSTITUTION
OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980; see Jill I.
Goldenziel, Veiled Political Questions: Islamic Dress, Constitutionalism, and the Ascend-
ance of Courts, 61 Am. J. COmP. L. 1, 17 (2013) (describing the content of Article 2 of the
Egyptian Constitution). Hence I find my definition, while contestable, more appropriate
under the circumstances.
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is understood within the industry)4 because fundamental and indispensable
parts of United States banking regulation require as much.
Notwithstanding such impossibility, Islamic banking is also highly de-
sired in that there is a preoccupation-an obsession one might say-with
finding a way to enhance the very limited Islamic commercial banking
6
opportunities that exist in the United States. Law review articles, govern-
ment issued policy reports,7 trade publications,8 and Islamic finance outlets
themselves 9 have discussed-and in some cases advanced-such initiatives
at one time or another. Unsurprisingly, these have led largely nowhere because,
' I do not claim the derivations of shari'a put forth by modem clerics respecting core
Islamic prohibitions in commerce and finance are the only plausible interpretations of
Islam's sacred texts that can be developed in those fields. In fact, in earlier work, I pointed
to contrary interpretations that are plausible. Haider Ala Hamoudi, Muhammad's Social
Justice or Muslim Cant?: Langdellianism and the Future of Islamic Finance, 40
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 89, 128-30 (2007) (describing efforts by Arab jurist Abdul Razzaq al-
Sanhuri to cast the traditional Islamic prohibition on riba as only tangentially concerned
with lending money at interest). The point here, however, is that whether or not other plau-
sible interpretations of shari'a exist, Islamic finance as an industry has developed its own
specific set of prohibitions from the shari'a. Any financial institution purporting to act as a
retail bank in the United States would necessarily be in violation of more than a few of them,
several of which are quite central. Given that an Islamic bank could not credibly disregard
broad industry consensus respecting what the shari'a does and does not allow in favor of
its own (self-serving) interpretations, this presents a rather serious problem.
* See infra Part II (exploring this in detail).
6 Roberta Mann, Is Sharifs Castle Deductible: Islam and the Tax Treatment of Mortgage
Debt, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1139, 1166-69 (2009). There are also a number of
well-written law review notes that argue in favor of regulatory adjustment to accommodate
Islamic finance. See generally Sulman A. Bhatti, Note, The Shari'ah and the Challenge
and Opportunity of Embracing Finance "Without Interest," 2010 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
205, 207 (2010); Mushfique Shams Billah, Comment, Arab Money: Why Isn't the United
States Getting Any?, 32 U. PA. J. INT'LL. 1055, 1058 (2011); Kyle Gaffaney, Student Article,
Buying a Home Can Be Difficult for Muslims in the United States, 21 LoY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 557, 565 (2009).
' Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Exec. Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bank of
N.Y., Speech Before the Seminar on Legal Issues in the Islamic Financial Services Industry:
Regulation of Islamic Financial Services in the United States (Mar. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2005/bax050302.html; SHAYERAH ILIAS,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS2293 1, ISLAMIC FINANCE: OVERVIEW AND POLICY CONCERNS
8 (2010); Shirley Chiu et al., Islamic Finance in the United States: A Small but Growing
Industry, CHI. FED. LETTER No. 214 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi.), May 2005, available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital assets/publications/chicago fed letter/2005/cflmay2005
214.pdf.
8 See, e.g., Vikram Modi, Writing the Rules: The Need for Standardized Regulation of
Islamic Finance, 29 HARV. INT'L REV. 38, 41 (Spring 2007).
9 See, e.g., Abdi Shayesteh, Islamic Banks in the United States: Breaking Through the
Barriers, NEWHORIZON, Apr.-June 2009, at 1.
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as noted above, the project is an impossibility. There is no credible shari'a
compliant banking institution to facilitate. Instead, there are only com-
promises to be made, inevitably on the side of the Islamic bank, and plain
shari'a violations to endure. 10
If this is so, and the next two Parts of the Article will be devoted to
demonstrating that it is, then it is worth investigating why there is such in-
terest in Islamic retail banking. Regulators could, after all, figuratively shrug
their shoulders and inform Islamic banking enthusiasts that American law and
regulation can no more accommodate the practice of Islamic banking than
it can accommodate a group of people who refuse to pay income taxes for
purportedly religious reasons." Islamic banking enthusiasts could see the
reality for what it is, resign themselves to the current state of affairs, and give
up on an Islamic bank, at least in the short to medium term, given the funda-
mental incompatibilities it presents to American regulation. Instead there is
the endless repetition of a charade, where one side pretends to care about
accommodation, and the other pretends to find a way to work within accom-
modations provided, when it is perfectly clear that on the plains of doctrine,
the two sides cannot possibly meet.
In fact, there is ample reason the efforts continue.12 But to understand
it, we must look beyond the legal doctrine underlying Islamic retail banking
on the one hand, and American regulation of financial institutions on the
other. In fact, the matter has relatively little to do with the niceties of bank-
ing regulation on its own terms, Islamic or American. Instead, the bank, and
the accommodation of it within the U.S. regulatory sphere, merely represents
a symbol for the accommodation of the broader, pious Muslim public. 13
10 See McKean James Evans, Note, The Future of Conflict Between Islamic and Western
Financial Systems: Profit, Principle and Pragmatism, 71 U. PITT. L. REv. 819, 820 (2010)
(predicting that "accommodations made by Western systems will be primarily formalistic,
while the compromises made by the Islamic system will come mainly from principle.").
" Numerous individuals have claimed, and continue to claim, that the payment of income
taxes violates their religious conscience and therefore applying the tax laws to them is a vio-
lation of the Free Exercise Clause, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (West 2013). Courts
invariably reject such claims because of the compelling government interest in "maintain-
ing a sound tax system, free of myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious
beliefs." Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989) (citations omitted). See also
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) (stating the same with respect to social
security taxes); Jenkins v. Comm'r, 483 F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting a similar claim
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). The governmental interests in maintaining a
sound financial system are surely no less strong, particularly following the financial crisis
that began with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.
12 See infra Part II.E.
13 See infra Part III.A.
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The pious Muslim, eager to see an Islamic bank open in her neighbor-
hood, earn a national charter, and offer products and services, including de-
mand deposit services, is at best only partly interested in adherence to religious
doctrine. At the very least, with the slightest bit of inspection, that Muslim
will surely discover practices at stark variance with some of the core rules
of Islamic finance and almost in direct opposition to the purported principles
of the practice. Yet, the Muslim remains eager because the Islamic bank
is a reflection of a broader recognition of her space in the broader American
fabric. Her religion is not only recognized, but her financial practices are
respected and indeed legitimized by the relevant American legal and regu-
latory regime. She is, in this sense, comfortable being both thoroughly
American and thoroughly Muslim.
As for American regulators and most policymakers, part of the nation's
elite, they instinctually prefer messages of inclusion to those that appear
xenophobic or intolerant, and they are predisposed to help find a way to ac-
commodate this broad Muslim desire. Hence, members of the Department
of the Treasury assure us in remarks and publications that such efforts at ac-
commodation are underway.1 7 Federal regulators regularly appear at Islamic
finance conferences.1 Several participated in a workshop sponsored by the
Islamic Finance Project of Harvard Law School in 2004 dedicated specifi-
cally to discussing regulatory concerns, and the keynote speaker was the
Undersecretary for the Treasury. 19 In 2005, the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York sponsored a conference in Kuwait City on a similar topic.20 In
2008, the Department of Treasury sponsored a seminar in Washington, DC
entitled "Islamic Finance 101.,,21 In addition to scheduling and attending all
of these conferences, in 2004, the Department of the Treasury initiated a
"scholar in residence" program to help the Department better understand
Islamic finance and named its first scholar in residence.22
14 See infra Part III.A.
15 See infra Part III.A.
16 See infra Part II.A.
17 See Baxter, supra note 7, at 1-3; Chiu et al., supra note 7, at 3-4.
18 It is rare for any Islamic finance conference or seminar in the United States, among
the many that I have attended, not to have a speaker on a panel who serves in some regu-
lator17 capacity in the federal government. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 7, at 2.
Program ofSixth Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance, ISLAMIC FINANCE
PROJECT OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, ifp.law.harvard.edu/login/viewpdf/?file=forum6th
.pdf&type=forums (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) [hereinafter Program].
20 William L. Rutledge, Exec. Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at
the 2005 Arab Bankers Association of North America (ABANA) Conference on Islamic
Finance: Players, Products & Innovations in New York City (Apr. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2005/rut050422.html.
21 Shayesteh, supra note 9, at 2.
22 Baxter, supra note 7, at 2. For reasons that are somewhat unclear, the Department of
the Treasury selected as its first scholar in residence, ilahmoud El-Gamal, a critic of Islamic
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The purpose of all of this engagement-undertaken under both Demo-
cratic and Republican administrations-is hardly to develop useful consen-
sual solutions to outstanding regulatory concerns. The Department does not
need a "scholar in residence" 23 or an "Islamic Finance 101" seminar to do
that.24 It surely is aware of the premier regulatory issues and obstacles. If its
staff did not learn them sufficiently at the Islamic Finance Project seminar
25 2in Harvard Law School in 2004, in New York City in 2005,26 or at the
Islamic Finance 101 conference in 2009,27 it is hard to imagine they will
learn them now. In any event, as explored further below, it really matters
little what the Treasury Department actually knows about Islamic finance.
This is because it is perfectly clear that accommodating an Islamic bank is
impossible, doctrinally unthinkable given the central purposes of banking
regulation in the United States.
Rather, dialogue and engagement help to demonstrate something else;
namely, that the government is determined to help to find space for the
pious Muslim in the United States, respectful of the pious Muslim's reli-
gious commitments and aware of the Muslim's ability to function both as
Muslim and as American simultaneously. Thus, the dialogue and engagement
for the most part occurred after September 11, 2001, when the position of
Muslims in the United States was the most vulnerable. Yet, by that time, the
Department of the Treasury had already made the major substantive accom-
modations it was willing to make to integrate Islamic finance into the rubric
of American banking regulations. This was done in the form of two interpretive
letters issued by its Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), in
1997 and 1999, respectively.28 In other words, the actual accommodations
preceded the dialogue and the engagement precisely because the govem-
ment was not engaging in dialogue in order to overcome remaining obstacles
through some sort of further accommodation, but rather to demonstrate a
desire to integrate Muslims into the broader American fabric.29
finance so severe that he describes existing Islamic finance practices as being a form of
"shari'a arbitrage" and compares the collection of the fees and expenses gathered by those
that design and bless shari'a compliant transactions to the medieval practices of selling in-
dulgences. MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS AND PRACTICE
1(2006).
23 See Baxter, supra note 7, at 2.
24 See Shayesteh, supra note 9, at 2.
25 Program, supra note 19.
26 Rutledge, supra note 20.
27 Shayesteh, supra note 9, at 2.
28 See Rutledge, supra note 20. The interpretive letters are also discussed in greater de-
tail in the next section.
29 See id.
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The symbolic power of Islamic finance as a form of welcoming a Muslim
presence in the United States is not lost on those who view the growing
Muslim presence on American soil as some sort of existential threat. Thus,
just as there are efforts at accommodation on the part of executive officials,
there has also been a widespread, sustained and multipronged attack on
Islamic finance, precisely on the (erroneous and in fact inane) grounds it helps
to fund terrorism and jihadism and otherwise threatens American security.30
30 This is very much an effort directed at Muslim exclusion. Islamophobic elements,
for example, began a well-nigh incoherent campaign to remove halal meat from stores in
France. Dale Hurd, Auslim Halal Food Sales Supporting Terrorism?, CBN NEWS (Jan. 9,
2011), http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/201 1/January/Muslim-Halal-Food-Sales-Sup
porting-Terrorism/. The effort might be deemed quixotic, but, more successfully, in the
state of Oklahoma, a state amendment to the constitution was passed that read in relevant
part as follows:
The Courts [in] exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere
to the law as provided in the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma
Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated
pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and
rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of another
state of the United States provided the law of the other state does not
include Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions. The courts shall not look
to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts
shall not consider international law or Sharia Law. The provisions of this
subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts including,
but not limited to, cases of first impression.
The Tenth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction against implementation of the amend-
ment on the grounds that the amendment is in violation of the Establishment Clause. Awad
v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 2012). The Western District of Oklahoma then
entered a permanent injunction in August of 2013 on the same grounds. Awad v. Ziriax,
No. CIV-10-1186-M, 2013 WL 4441476 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 15, 2013). For an excellent and
thorough discussion of the amendment and its potential implications concerning shari'a,
international law, and the conflict of laws, see generally John T. Parry, Oklahoma's Save
Our State Amendment and the Conflict ofLaws, 65 OKLA. L. REv. 1 (2012).
Other legislative efforts exist as well, including Tennessee's proposed anti-shari'a
measure. This bill defines a shari'a organization as two or more persons practicing shari'a,
defines shari'a as rules "emanat[ing] directly or indirectly from the god of Allah and the
Prophet Mohammed," and indicates that to offer material support to a shari'a organization
designated by the Attorney General as having a terrorist intent is a felony carrying a 15 year
minimum prison sentence. S.B. 1028, 107th Leg. (Tenn. 2011), §§ 39-13-904(1)-(2), 39-
13-906(a)(1)(B). Because the primary sources of Islam encompass rules of worship, such as
prayer, this means that a shari 'a organization is any two individuals who gather for group
prayers whom the Attorney General decides have terrorist intent. N. J. COuLSON, A HISTORY
OF ISLAMIC LAW 12 (1964). To offer these individuals a place to pray would then, under this
bill, constitute a felony punishable by a minimum of fifteen years in prison. Unsurprisingly,
few Muslims find comfort in the bill's simultaneous assurance that it "neither targets, nor
incidentally prohibits or inhibits, the peaceful practice of any religion, and in particular, the
practice of Islam by its adherents." S.B. 1028, 107th Leg. (Tenn. 2011) § 39-13-903(4).
[Vol. 5:105
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Just as the hopeless and impossible-to-satisfy efforts to accommodate Islamic
banking arise more out of a wellspring of tolerance and inclusion, so the ef-
forts to end all forms of Islamic finance arise more out of a desire to exclude
Muslims than they do out of any reasonably articulated doctrinal objection
31to Islamic finance per se.
There are broader lessons we can glean from the story of Islamic banking
in America. One important lesson concerns the surprising resilience and indeed
expansion of Islamic finance across the globe. It is no secret that the global
Islamic finance industry has made significant compromises of its own. Many
commentators have pointed out that it has departed from its own idealistic
visions to achieve something that looks more like a mimicry of conventional
finance to comply with narrow and highly formalistic prohibitions.32 This
criticism has become something of a mainstay in conferences devoted to
Islamic finance and in discussions about the practice.33 Despite the extensive
Finally, of course, there are the efforts to prohibit mosque buildings in various parts
of the United States. The media explosion surrounding the building of a so-called "Ground
Zero Mosque"-in fact a Muslim community center several blocks away from the site of the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001-is well known. See Robert Farley, Fact Checking
the 'Ground Zero Mosque' Debate, POLITIFACT (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.politifact.com
/truth-o-meter/article/2010/aug/20/fact-checking-ground-zero-mosque-debate/. Less well known
is the opposition that greets proposed mosque-building projects as far from Ground Zero
as Murfreesboro, Tennessee. Robbie Brown & Christine Hauser, After a Struggle, Mosque
Opens in Tennessee, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/us
/islamic-center-of-murfreesboro-opens-in-tennessee.html. In addition, one member of Con-
gress has declared that America already has "too many mosques" and 85 percent of the
existing mosques are controlled by extremists. Rep. Peter King: There are 'too many
mosques in this country,' POLITICO (Sept. 19, 2007, 7:22 PM), http://www.politico.com
/blogs/thecrypt/0907/Rep KingThereare toomanymosquesin thiscountry_.html.
31 See infra Part III.B.
32 See, e.g., Hamoudi, supra note 4, at 94 ("Proponents of Islamic finance often repeat ...
functional objectives of fairness and social justice, but do not employ appropriate methodo-
logical techniques to achieve these goals."); Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, "Interest" and the
Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Law and Finance, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 108, 127
(2003) ("On the assets side, Islamic banks avoid the risks of profit and loss-sharing invest-
ment arrangements by engaging mostly in cost-plus trading and lease financing .... [B]oth
forms of finance mimic conventional bank financing to a very high degree, with few tech-
nical details."); Nazim Zaman & Mehmet Asutay, Divergence Between Aspirations and
Realities of Islamic Economics: A Political Economy Approach to Bridging the Divide,
17 HUM J. ECON. & MGMT. 73, 74 (2009) ("[T]he Islamic banking and finance (IBF)
industry ... unfortunately has not realized the goals and aspirations put forward by the pio-
neers in the 1960s and early 1970s. Rather, the ... industry seems to have grown as part of
the conventional financial sector in the global capitalist economy.").
33 Zubair Hasan, Islamic Banking at the Crossroads: Theory Versus Practice, in
ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON WEALTH CREATION 11 (Munawar Iqbal & Rodney Wilson eds.,
2005); Zaman & Asutay, supra note 32, at 74.
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dialogue and expressions of concern both within and outside the industry,
the practice has not changed,34 and more importantly, it has not needed to.
The practice is quite capable of expanding at dizzying rates using almost ex-
clusively narrow and formalistic techniques that even widely respected pro-
ponents of the practice do not defend with any degree of vigor.3
This is another riddle, one that is related to the paradox concerning the
mystifying interest in the impossible American Islamic bank. One might
expect less interest in Islamic finance as it grew increasingly narrow, formal-
istic and mimicking. Specifically, to quote one prominent Islamic scholar
who is a leader in the industry, the fear would be that "[i]f the system does
not make significant progress" in realizing its own articulated vision of what
Islamic finance is supposed to achieve, "it will lose credibility in the eyes of
the Muslim masses and the rapid progress that it has been making may not
be sustainable." 36 That statement was made in 2008, when Islamic finance
was estimated to involve $500 billion in assets.37 An Ernst & Young report
suggested at the end of 2012 that in 2013, Islamic finance would surpass the
$1.8 trillion mark.38 The resilience demands explanation, and extralegal
considerations of the sort discussed in the context of the American Islamic
bank help to explain it.
Part I of this Article discusses in greater detail the practice of Islamic
finance, and outlines its vision of profit and loss sharing. This Part also de-
scribes the broad deviation from the ideal practice that generally occurs irre-
spective of regulatory obstacles. Part II sets forth precisely why American laws
and regulations not only render the ideal vision unrealistic, but also would
force fairly central violations of shari'a onto an Islamic bank, thereby making
it impossible to credibly claim that it is a shari'a compliant institution. Hav-
ing demonstrated the impossibility of the Islamic banking enterprise, Part III
offers an alternative explanation for the broad Muslim desire for more Islamic
banking in the United States and the reason the Department of the Treasury
has gone through such great efforts to engage with it to no obvious fruitful
34 See, e.g., MuFri MUHAMMAD TAQI USMANI, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE
161-69 (2d ed. 2008) (expressing dismay at the failure of Islamic banks to adhere to the prin-
ciples of Islamic finance as they expand). See generally M. Umer Chapra, Speech at Eighth
Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance: Innovation and Authenticity 11-14 (Apr. 19,
2008), http://ifp.law.harvard.edu/login/viewpdf/?file=Ummer Chapra.pdf&type=forums.
35 Chapra, supra note 34, at 11-14 (describing the respective positions of Usmani and
Chapra on some of the artifices used to evade core shari'a prohibitions).
36 Id at 12.
37 Isam Salah, Islamic Finance in the Current Financial Crisis, 2 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E.
& ISLAMIC L. 137, 138 (2009) (citing a study and projection undertakenby Moody's in 2008).
38 International Connectivity Vital for Further Growth of the Islamic Banking Industry,
BAHRAINI NEWS AGENCY (May 20, 2013, 3:04 PM), http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news
/561535 [hereinafter Future Growth].
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end. This is a quest for greater Muslim belonging, a sentiment on both sides
to seek Muslim inclusion in the broader national fabric. This Part also shows
the manner in which opposition to Islamic finance in the United States is
better understood as an effort to exclude and isolate Muslims than as any
sort of principled objection to the practice on its own terms. Finally, the
Conclusion presents summary thoughts on why taking account of extra-
doctrinal considerations, of the sort explored in this Article not only sheds
light on why there is such interest in Islamic banking in the United States,
but also why Islamic finance continues to expand at such dizzying speeds
globally, notwithstanding its own compromises.
I. PROFIT AND Loss SHARING: THEORY AND PRACTICE
It is quite difficult to find an account of Islamic banking-whether in an
academic publication, a trade journal or a newspaper article-that does not at
least start with the canard that Islamic finance relies upon the principle of
profit and loss sharing, strictly forbidding the interest-based return on which
conventional banks rely.39 Hence, early Islamic finance advocates posited
the ideal form of the Islamic bank as a two-tiered silent partnership. 40 At the
lowest end of the system were the portfolio investments, where a bank, as
"silent partner," supplied necessary finance and an entrepreneur did the nec-
essary labor, thereby justifying an agreed upon division of profits and losses
for each of them based on a ratio they set between themselves.41 Then, as the
ventures made (or lost) money, the bank's portion of the profits (or losses)
generated would be funneled through the bank and its depositors.42 In this
second silent partnership, it is the bank effectively doing the labor vis-a-vis
the depositors, who are the silent partners.43
39 For representative examples of this, see ABDULLAH SAEED, ISLAMIC BANKING AND
INTEREST 1 (2d ed. 1999) ("The theory of Islamic banking ... maintains that Islamic banking
is interest-free banking based on the concepts of mud5raba and mush5raka, that is, Profit
and Loss Sharing (PLS)."); USMANI, supra note 34, at 27-28; Abbas Mirakhor & Iqbal
Zaidi, Profit-and-Loss Sharing Contracts in Islamic Finance, in HANDBOOK OF ISLAMIC
BANKING 49 (Hassan & Lewis eds., 2007) ("The main difference between an Islamic or
interest-free banking system and the conventional interest-based banking system is that, under
the latter, the profit is fixed in advance or is a simple linear function of some other bench-
mark rate, whereas, in the former, the profits and losses on a physical investment are shared
between the creditor and the borrower according to a formula that reflects their respective
levels of participation."); Chiu et al., supra note 7, at 1 (indicating that Islamic finance "is
based on a profit and loss structure rather than a lender-borrower arrangement").
40 VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 3, at 130-31.
41Id. at 129-30.
42 Id. at 130.
43 Id. at 130-31.
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At the portfolio level, this is in sharp contradistinction to conventional
loans, which involve an obligation to pay back the lender an additional
amount corresponding to interest irrespective of the extent to which the bor-
rower has profited or lost money from the underlying enterprise. Islamic
finance sharply decries such a practice, declaring interest in all forms to be
absolutely prohibited under the shari 'a.44 The chief justification for this in-
terest ban offered by Islamic finance advocates is precisely that lending at
interest does not call for sharing in gains and losses, but rather requires one
party to bear the losses even as the other earns profit.4 5
A sample bank portfolio might then involve, for example, credit offered
to homeowners to fund the purchase of homes. However, where in conven-
tional finance the bank would simply loan the money to a homeowner and
expect repayment at interest, in an Islamic system, the bank and the putative
homeowner would buy the home together.46 When the home was sold, they
would then share in the profits or losses from the sale, as the case may
be.4 Hence, if the home was purchased for $100,000, with the homeowner
supplying a down payment of $10,000, then rather than the bank lending the
$90,000 balance, it would own 90 percent of the home. If the home were
instantaneously resold, profits or losses would be divided between the home-
owner and bank based on their respective ownership percentages.
Of course, in most situations, the parties do not immediately resell the
home because the point of the transaction was not speculation but because
the homeowner wanted to live in the home. In such circumstances, the home-
owner would be living in a house that the bank primarily paid for. Obviously,
the bank, whether Islamic or otherwise, is a profit making institution and
" MUHAMMAD NEJATULLAH SIDDIQI, BANKING WITHOUT INTEREST 7 (1983) (describ-
ing the position permitting some forms of interest as "defeatist"); SAEED, supra note 39, at
50 (describing this position prohibiting interest as "dominant" and "the basis of Islamic
banking theory as well as practice."); Muhammad Uzair, Impact ofInterest Free Banking, 3
J. ISLAMIC BANKING & FIN. 39, 40 (1984) ("By this time, there is a complete consensus of
all ... schools ... and among Islamic economists, that interest in all forms, of all kinds, and for
all purposes is completely prohibited in Islam. Gone are the days when people were apol-
ogetic about Islam and contended that the interest for commercial and business purposes,
as presently charged by banks, was not prohibited by Islam.").
1 Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Muezzin's Call and the Dow Jones Bell: On the Necessity
ofRealism in the Study oflslamic Law, 56 AM. J. CoMP. L. 423, 456-58 (2008).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Technically, this arrangement would not be a mudaraba, or silent partnership, where
one party supplies the labor and the other the capital, as would be the case, for example, if a
bank supplied capital to a chef to open a restaurant. Rather, it is a musharaka, because each
party contributes capital to the enterprise. USMANI, supra note 34, at 47 (describing the
distinction between mudaraba and musharaka).
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is therefore hardly in the business of offering its customers free housing in-
definitely. Thus, as part of the overall transaction, the homeowner would
have to agree to pay rent for the privilege of living in the home, with the
proceeds of such rent accruing partially to the homeowner and partially to
the bank based on their respective ownership proportions.49 In other words,
if the parties set the rent to the homeowner at $1,000 a month, then $900 of
it would run to the bank, and $100 would belong to the homeowner because
the homeowner owns 10 percent of the house. That portion of the rent ac-
cruing to the bank is profit to the bank, to be shared with its depositors based
on the sharing percentages to which they agreed.50 The balance of the rent is
also paid over to the bank by the homeowner for the purpose of purchasing a
very small ownership stake from the bank. Thus, after one monthly payment,
the homeowner has paid $900 in rent to the bank and purchased a $100
ownership stake, or .1 percent of the value of the home, so that its ownership
stake is now 10.1 percent and the bank's is the balance, or 89.9 percent.
Over time, as the ownership percentage of the homeowner increases,
the homeowner uses more of the monthly payment to purchase an owner-
ship percentage, and less profit is thus given to the bank (and derivatively, its
depositors). To see why this is so, assume after some number of monthly pay-
ments, the homeowner's ownership percentage in the home has increased
from 10 percent to 20 percent. At this point, if the rent remains $1,000, then
only $800 is due the bank because it only owns 80 percent of the home, and
the remaining $200 is directed to home purchase, meaning the monthly
payment now secures a .2 percent increase in the homeowner's ownership
percentage. Eventually in such a case, over the course of some number of
years, the homeowner will own the home outright. By adjusting the rent
figures, it would not be difficult for the parties to fix that term as the same
thirty years used in conventional mortgages.
At a superficial level, this seems to resemble a conventional mortgage in
many ways. The homeowner pays a set amount for thirty years and at the end
owns the home clear of any cloud on the title. However, there are quite
significant differences with conventional finance given the bank's continu-
ing ownership of part of the home. For one thing, the bank would have a
strong interest in insuring a suitable resale price of the home. After all, if the
$100,000 home rose in value to $150,000 and it was sold, the bank would
share in the $50,000 profit based on its percentage ownership. Likewise, if
' VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 3, at 138-39.
50 In Islamic parlance, such a leasing arrangement is referred to as an ijara. See id. at 9.
51 This entire transaction is referred to as a "diminishing musharaka" because of the
reduction and ultimate elimination of the bank's ownership share as the homeowner pur-
chases it. See Mann, supra note 6, at 1150.
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the property dropped in value to $50,000, and the parties chose to sell the
home, they would likewise share in the loss of $50,000 at the same rate.
Moreover, those same profits and losses funnel through to the depositors
in the bank. Let us assume the bank shares profits and losses with its bor-
rowers such that its borrowers collectively receive half of the profits and
losses in the joint venture, with the bank receiving the other half. In that
case, the sale of the home for $150,000 would lead to the bank's total gain
of $45,000 (assuming it owned 90 percent of the home at the time of sale).
This gain would be shared equally by the bank, which would receive
$22,500, and its depositors, who would collectively receive $22,500 as well,
divided pro rata based on the size of their deposits. If the house were sold
at a $50,000 loss, then the depositors and the bank would share their losses
in the same amounts.
While advocates of Islamic finance have heaped no shortage of praise
52*
upon this method of financing, it suffers from one significant drawback. It
does not work, and for reasons quite apart from regulatory constraints.53 For
one thing, depositors with demand deposit accounts are not likely to be par-
ticularly patient for very long if they see their deposit amounts reduced be-
cause of bank losses. This leaves the bank quite susceptible to a bank run as
depositors rush to withdraw their funds before the cash runs out.54 Moreover,
the bank would need to be much more involved in the monitoring and man-
agement of its portfolio investments if it were to be sharing in their profits,
rather than just earning a fixed return. 5 This would not be cheap, and would
56
reduce the returns of the depositors, leading the bank to be uncompetitive.
For these and many other reasons, those banks which initially tried profit and
loss sharing-in jurisdictions where bank regulation presented no obstacle-
failed rather miserably at it, and alternative models began to develop.
These alternative models have traditionally been based on the artifice
known as the murabaha, which works out to a credit sale with a markup.58
52 See, e.g., Mirakhor & Zaidi, supra note 39, at 49 ("[P]rofit-sharing contracts have
superior properties for risk management, because the payment the entrepreneur has to make
to the creditor is reduced in bad states of nature."); USMANI, supra note 34, at 27-28; Chapra,
supra note 34, at 4 ("Instead of making the bankers as well as depositors share in the risks
of business, the conventional financial system almost relieves them of the risks. The ability
of the market to impose the required discipline thus gets impaired and leads to an unhealthy
expansion in the overall volume of credit, to excessive leverage, to even subprime debt, and
to living beyond means.").
53 VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 3, at 135.
5 1d. at 134.
5 Hamoudi, supra note 4, at 117.
56 d
57 Id. at 117-18.
58 VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 3, at 135.
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Essentially, the bank purchases the entire property, and then sells it imme-
diately to the homeowner at a markup, with the homeowner paying $10,000
59immediately, and the balance over the course of thirty years.
It should not be difficult to see how this replicates a fixed rate mortgage
in its economic effects much more closely than it does a profit and loss shar-
ing model. For a fixed rate thirty-year mortgage, at an interest rate of 3.770
percent, a $90,000 loan for a $100,000 home (with the homeowner paying
the balance as a $10,000 down payment) would require a total payment of
$150,417.39, divided into equal monthly installments of $417.83. However,
if the bank were not to loan the money at all, but purchase the home on the
market for $100,000, then it could sell it to the homeowner for $160,417.39.
Of this sum, $10,000 is due immediately and the balance, of $150,417.39,
would be due to the bank, with the homeowner paying it in monthly in-
stallments of $417.83. This amount would not be subject to change if the
value of the home increased or decreased, because the bank had already sold
the home to the homeowner for a price certain. The primary risks to the
bank-the bankruptcy or delinquency of the homeowner-are those that
exist as to a conventional lender as well. There is simply not very much profit
or loss sharing to speak of. Still, the murabaha is one of the two premier
contracts used in Islamic retail banking.60
Despite the obvious departure from the profit and loss sharing princi-
ple, industry advocates provide two reasons for the permissibility of the
murabaha. First, while it is hardly the ideal instrument to be used to bring
about Islamic banking in its purest form, it is characterized by leading Islamic
finance expert M. Taqi Usmani as a "transitory step taken in the process of
the Islamization of the economy," necessary given the hegemony of conven-
tional banking methods and techniques. 61 This notion that Islamic finance is
neither of a size nor in a setting necessary to enable it to carry through on its
62true principles of profit sharing is a rather popular one. It is used to justify
almost any compromise that the industry makes from the values it articu-
lates respecting profit and loss sharing.6
59 d.
60 Hamoudi, supra note 4, at 119. See also Umar F. Moghul, No Pain, No Gain: The
State of the Industry in Light of an American Islamic Private Equity Transaction, 7 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 469, 471 (2007). The other major form of financing is lease financing, through
the ijara. I have not discussed lease financing here as used in the industry extensively for
reasons of space, but it suffices to say for these purposes that Islamic financing through
ijara relies no more on profit and loss sharing than the murabaha does. Id.; see also El-
Gamal, supra note 32, at 129.
61 USMANI, supra note 34, at 72.
62 Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Surprising Irrelevance of Islamic Bankruptcy, 19 AM.
BANK. INST. L. REv. 505, 517 (2011).
63 See, e.g., Moghul, supra note 60, at 471-73.
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The second justification for the murabaha, and the more pertinent one
for our purposes, is that when properly administered, it is different from a
conventional loan even if it is not very much of a profit and loss sharing
64instrument. This is because the bank does own the home for the period of
time between purchasing it, and eventually transferring it to the homeowner
via a resale. This element of possession, physical or constructive is described
by the widely respected M. Taqi Usmani as "the only feature of murabaha
which can distinguish it from an interest-based transaction[.]" He insists
that it "must be observed with due diligence at all costs," emphasizing the
point by placing this proviso in bold letters.6 5
To be clear, this incidence of ownership does not create a risk if adminis-
tered by any reasonably competent bank manager.66 Admittedly, if the period
of time that the bank happens to own the real estate before it has been trans-
ferred to the homeowner was significant, then a risk might indeed exist. That
risk would not be that the homeowner would somehow refuse to purchase
the property because that sale contract would have been concluded before
the bank initially purchased the property. Rather, it would be that during the
period that the bank owned the home, the home might be destroyed by fire or
other natural disaster, that the value of the property would diminish dramat-
ically for any other reason, triggering a buyer default, or that any of the other
risks incident to the ownership of property might come to pass.
Yet while he does not say this, surely Usmani realizes as well as anyone
else how easy it is to reduce that risk to such an extent that it is infinites-
imally small and entirely meaningless by any effective measure.67 If the
bank's sole risk lies in holding the property for some period of time, and yet
no minimum period of time is specified, the obvious solution would be to
reduce the time period of such ownership. The chance of a zoning change
taking effect over a particular piece of property on a given day might be
small, but the chance that it occurs in a five minute period is even smaller,
and over five seconds smaller yet. Render the period one one-thousandth
of a second, and only marginal risks remain.
Thus, even without regulatory constraints, we see that Islamic finance
exists in a considerably straitjacketed form, one that claims that the basis of
the industry is profit and loss sharing, but also one that has by its own admis-
sion relied instead heavily on artifice and mimicry to grow into the size that
it has.68 A primary justification offered in defense of such artifice, at least
64 d
65 USMANI, supra note 34, at 75.
66 Id. at 166.
67 -[d.
68 Id. at 162.
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with respect to the murabaha, is that the fact of property ownership involved
therewith distinguishes it in important ways from a conventional trans-
action, even if the risks associated with that ownership may be quite small.69
The next section will demonstrate how regulatory constraints require Islamic
banks to downplay and almost dismiss the latter formal distinction on which
such emphasis is placed. The section will further show how other, central
violations of shari'a likewise become necessary in order to comply with
fundamental U.S. regulatory rules.
II. ON THE ILLEGALITY OF BANK PROFIT AND Loss SHARING
Per U.S. regulation, banks are not supposed to operate under profit and
loss sharing principles.70 In fact, profit and loss sharing principles are the
antithesis of how banks are supposed to operate. A number of laws and reg-
ulations make this amply clear.n This section will describe a series of subject
areas in the field of financial regulation and further show the extent to which
the relevant rules in these respective areas make shari'a compliant banking
absolutely impossible. I begin with the most straightforward of the regula-
tory limitations, which prohibit the ownership of real estate outright.
A. Regulation and Asset Ownership
The National Banking Act generally bars a bank from owning real estate.72
The purpose of the real estate ban seems obvious enough-a bank should not
be subject to the risks of real estate ownership, from the potential decline in
housing values to risks associated with rezoning or natural disaster.73 Hence, as
an exception, a bank may own the real estate on which it places its branch
offices, and it may hold real estate for up to five years when the real estate
was secured by a mortgage issued by the bank. In the former case, the bank
would not be at any significant risk given the relatively small amount of
real property at issue. In the latter case, the circumstances make ownership
69 Id. at 166.
7o See infra Part II.A-C.
71 See infra Part II.A-C.
72 12 U.S.C.A. § 29 (West 2013).
73 Obviously, any bank that lends money to future homeowners is secondarily vulner-
able, to some extent, to the same risks as a homeowner because the homeowner who is sub-
jected directly to those risks is more likely to be delinquent in making mortgage payments
when there is a problem. Still, the risks of real estate ownership are most directly felt by the
owner rather than the institution that lent the owner the money necessary to make the pur-
chase. Or at least Congress appears to have so concluded by virtue of its enactment of the
real estate ownership ban for banks contained in 12 U.S.C.A. § 29.
7 12 U.S.C.A. § 29.
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unavoidable-the bank must foreclose on the property that secured its initial
loan if it is to get its money back-but are minimized to the extent realistic by
requiring a resale within five years of taking possession.
Highly idealized profit and loss sharing schemes such as those described
in the previous section are therefore unthinkable because they run directly
afoul of the letter and the spirit of the real estate ownership prohibition.
Interestingly, even the highly formalistic murabaha artifice seems to be en-
compassed within the ban as well, even if it does not involve a noticeable
risk to the bank by virtue of ownership. This is because the ban itself is not
conditioned upon any assumption of risk, but instead flatly prevents a bank
from being able to lawfully "purchase, hold and convey real estate., 76 In a
murabaha transaction, it would be doing all three prohibited acts, purchasing
the real estate on behalf of the buyer, holding it for an infinitesimal period of
time, and then conveying it to the buyer. Yet, without being able to engage
in this practice, one of the premier profit-making instruments of the Islamic
bank would be taken away, and it could not function.
The solution was to treat the ownership as fiction, and indeed to condi-
tion permissibility on the maintaining of that fiction.7 8 The specific context
of that solution arose in 1999, when the Islamic Bank of Kuwait sought to
issue murabaha facilities in the United States notwithstanding the real estate
prohibition.7 9 In so doing, it made a series of representations respecting the
nature of the murabaha that ultimately made their way into the OCC's inter-
pretive letter #867 of 1999 and on the basis of which the interpretive letter
permitted the practice notwithstanding the statutory prohibition.so
Hence, for example, the interpretive letter describes the transaction as one
in which the customer identifies the property, negotiates the price with the
seller, and applies to the bank for financing.81 If the bank approves, then the
bank simultaneously enters into a purchase agreement with the seller and a
murabaha with the buyer. The bank then purchases the property from the
seller and simultaneously sells it to the buyer at a markup which is 'typically'
75 Id.
76 jd
7 USMANI, supra note 34, at 166.
78 Victoria Lynn Zyp, Islamic Finance in The States: Product Development and Regu-
latory Adoption 19-20 (Apr. 21, 2009) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Georgetown University),
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/552821/ZypVictoriaLynn
.pdf?sequence= 1.
79 Id. at 10-11.
soId. at 15, 20.
81 Office of the Dist. Counsel, Comptroller of the Currency, Adm'r of Nat'l Banks,
Interpretive Letter #867, at 2 (Nov. 1999), http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and
-precedents/nov99/int867.pdf [hereinafter OCC Letter 867].
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based on LIBOR, a standard benchmark interest rate. 82 The letter requires
the bank to represent that the transaction is "functionally equivalent" to a se-
cured loan and indeed relies on this representation to permit the practice. 83
Given the simultaneous purchase and resale by the bank, the matter of its
ownership then becomes almost metaphysical in nature. How does one go
about "owning" an item for no time at all? If this were not enough, addi-
tional provisions reduce any risks of ownership to the real estate that might
remain. Specifically, the interpretive letter requires the bank's representation
that the risks in the transaction "are identical to the risks in a conventional
mortgage or loan transaction. Rather incoherently, the customer must also
have already made its down payment before the first sale to the bank takes
place, meaning that the purchaser has paid an institution to purchase property
from it that it does not own. Moreover, no representations or warranties may
be given by the bank as to the underlying property. Finally, the bank agrees
it "will not operate the property, pay taxes, insurance, or other charges, main-
tain upkeep of the premises, make repairs when necessary, assume liability
for injuries or other accidents on the property, or otherwise exercise dominion
or control over the property." 86 In sum, in all legal and economic respects, the
ownership by the bank-that one facet that Usmani indicates distinguishes
the murabaha from prohibited interest"-must be legally and economically
meaningless in its entirety if the transaction is to be legal. The bank must
disclose this or it may not operate lawfully.
Even the definition of title, the single formal indicium of ownership
left for the bank to cling to, is stripped bare in the context of the interpretive
letter's legal discussion. Not only does the legal discussion dismiss the issue
of bank ownership as being completely irrelevant to the economic substance
of the transaction, and repeat that at some length, but it also refers to the bank
holding only "legal" title.89 Lest the reader be confused as to what "legal
title" constitutes, the letter supplies a definition taken from Black's Law
Dictionary, to the effect that legal title creates an "apparent right of ownership
and possession" but "no beneficial interest therein." 90 The distinction as be-
tween legal title and beneficial interest is a natural and common one in trust
82 Id. at 2-3.
83 Id. at 1-2.
"Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
15 Id. at 4.
86 Id. at 5.
87 USMANI, supra note 34, at 75.
1d. at 75.
89 OCC Letter 867, supra note 81, at 8.
90
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law; where one person may own the assets, but may not be permitted to bene-
fit from them or their usufruct, even as another has a beneficiary interest, but
no legal title.91 In the context of a credit sale such as the murabaha, however,
its use is rather bizarre. It suggests that the bank never has an equitable right
in the property. 92 As a legal matter, it cannot do anything with the property;
the bank is merely the "apparent owner" with someone else (at first the orig-
inal seller and then the final purchaser), at all times holding all beneficial in-
terests in the property. Thus, the bank's ownership is entirely meaningless. 93
So as to underscore the matter, the letter concludes its legal section by indi-
cating that "despite the appearance of the Branch briefly holding real estate,"
the transaction is in substance that of mortgagor and mortgagee. 94
This letter, it must be emphasized, establishes the legal basis of all mura-
baha transactions undertaken by Islamic banks in the United States involv-
ing real property. 95 The compromise made by the banks to comply with
applicable laws and regulations could not be starker. Not only must they
abandon every pretense at profit and loss sharing, they must also explicitly
disclaim the sole distinction that exists between the murabaha and the con-
ventional loan, the fact of bank ownership. They cannot even credibly claim
very much in the way of formal ownership.96 To paraphrase from the inter-
pretive letter, all that is left for them is the appearance of the bank holding
real estate. 97 Usmani's distinction between the murabaha and the fixed in-
terest loan has thus collapsed into semantics: the bank is the owner only in
the sense that it claims ownership at the same moment it is transferring the
property.98 But for this entirely semantic claim, which the OCC is willing
to humor, the transaction is interest based. 99
Though this Article focuses primarily on use of the murabaha under
U.S. law, it is worth noting that a second interpretive letter, one dealing with
lease financing, was issued two years earlier in 1997, which also relied rather
heavily on the "largely cosmetic" nature of legal title and the fact that it does
not relate to the "indicia of ownership."100 That case largely involved per-
mission for a rent to own arrangement similar to the one discussed in the
91 See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 828 (8th ed. 2004) (defining beneficial interest
as distinguishable from legal title and offering a trust as an example).
92 OCC Letter 867, supra note 81, at 8.
93 jd
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 jd
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Office of the Dist. Counsel, Comptroller of the Currency, Adm'r of Nat'l Banks,
Interpretive Letter #806 (Dec. 1997), http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-prece
dents/dec97/in t806.pdf [hereinafter OCC Letter 806].
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previous Part except that in economic substance, the bank does not "actually
own real estate."10 The bank does not even own the property in any recogniz-
able legal sense. Nor does it maintain the property or pay property taxes.102
Instead, it records its interest in the property as if it were an ordinary mort-
gage, and its rights upon the owner's default are not those of a co-owner,
but of a secured lender.103 It is hard to even know what legal title consti-
tutes under such an arrangement, where the title documents themselves do
not suggest the bank is the legal owner, and where all of the bank's legal and
economic rights are identical to those of a secured lender, not a mortgagor.
B. Problems ofPrepayment
While the real estate ownership ban renders the practice of Islamic bank-
ing rather problematic, an Islamic bank might nonetheless insist that there is
some (bare) form of shari'a compliance at work given the OCC accom-
modations. The argument is a difficult one given the rather strained defini-
tion of title and the OCC demand that risks be identical to a conventional
loan. This is particularly important in light of Usmani's insistence that the
incidence of ownership supplies the basis of the distinction as between a
murabaha and a loan. 04 However, it is sustainable, in the highly abstract
sense that the bank "owned" the asset (albeit for no time at all given the
simultaneous transfer), and the OCC acknowledged that some type of legal
title transfer took place.105 The same is not true for several other regulatory
hurdles that make Islamic banking impossible. The most obvious of these
hurdles relates to prepayment.
When a borrower prepays under a conventional loan, the amount of in-
terest due on the loan is correspondingly reduced. That is, the borrower in
our previous section, who took out a thirty year $90,000 fixed interest mort-
gage at 3.770 percent, owes a net amount of $150,417.39 if each payment
is made on time. If the borrower manages to make a first monthly payment
of $30,000, effectively prepaying part of the principal of the loan, the total
amount due will be reduced. This is because interest will not be collecting on
the principal that the owner has already paid. While banks can offer mort-
gages with "prepayment penalties" that impose fees on borrowers who wish
to pay their mortgage in advance of its due date, the bank must disclose such
fees to the prospective homeowner. 10 6
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 2.
1o4 USMANI, supra note 34, at 73.
105 OCC Letter 867, supra note 81, at 6.
106 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(k) (2012). See also Ornstein et al., Prepayment Penalty Disclosure
Under the Truth in Lending Act, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 278 (2007) ("Regulation Z
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However, under a murabaha, a prepayment should have no effect at all
on the total sum due. The homeowner in the case of the murabaha has al-
ready committed to pay a purchase price. In our example above, that purchase
price, not counting the down payment, is $150,417.39. While the buyer is not
obligated to pay this sum in advance of the due date of the installments, the
buyer is also not relieved of its obligation to pay the total sum by virtue of
prepaying. o7 In fact, classical jurists generally, and the contemporary Islamic
Fiqh Academy specifically, forbid the conditioning of any prepayment of a
murabaha on the receipt of a discount for that prepayment. To quote al-
Zuhayli, one of the most prominent and well-known scholars of the modern
era: "a reduction of liability based on prepayment is very similar to increas-
ing it based on deferment." 109 The latter is almost the very definition of pro-
hibited money interest, meaning that to reduce a sum due and owing because
of a prepayment is to stand in opposition to shari'a, at least as it is understood
among the jurists and clerics who define the practice of Islamic finance.
There is, however, an exception that Islamic banks could claim to be ex-
ploiting, though it is not a particularly plausible one. Usmani indicates that
a voluntary rebate by a seller, one that was not conditioned by the buyer's
prepayment, is acceptable upon a buyer's prepayment so long as the buyer can-
not claim it by right and it is not a condition of the prepayment by contract.110
This exception appears quite far from the practice of one of the largest
Islamic banks operating in the United States, University Bank. It does not
even attempt to justify its commitment to forgive part of the buyer's pur-
chase price if it is prepaid. On its own website, in the "Frequently Asked
Questions" section, the following question and answer appear:
7. Can I pay off my contract early? Is there a penalty for doing this?
Our Murabaha contract does not have any pre-payment penalties. You
can pay off the remaining acquisition balance at any time you wish.
requires that in interest-bearing consumer credit transactions, such as most residential mort-
gage loans, creditors must disclose in the final TL disclosure whether there may be a pen-
alty for prepayment of the loan. Model Form H-2 suggests that the following statement be
included in the final TL disclosure: 'If you pay off early, you [may] [will not] be required
to pay a prepayment penalty.' A TILA violation will occur if the creditor checks the wrong
box or fails to check a box altogether.").
107 USMANI, supra note 34, at 99-100.
108 Id. at 99-100; Mohammad H. Fadel, Riba, Efficiency, and Prudential Regulation:
Preliminary Thoughts, 25 WIs. INT'L L.J. 655, 659-60 (2008) (citing Averroes for the
principle of forbidding the prepayment of a murabaha).
109 Fadel, supra note 108, at 660 n.21 (quoting WAHBAH AL-ZUHAYLI, FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 311 (Mahmoud A. El-Gamal trans., Dar al-
fikr, 2003)).
110 USMANI, supra note 34, at 143.
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Profit portion is prorated, and UIF agrees to accept lesser profit should
you choose to pay off the contract early.III
This is to some extent obfuscating, as in fact the issue with a murabaha
is not that there is a "penalty" for prepaying. Rather, what the bank de-
scribes as an "acquisition price"-the purchase price paid by the home-
owner-is being reduced by the bank virtue of the homeowner's early
payment. Moreover, this reduction is hardly "voluntary" and noncontractual,
as demanded by Usmani. The bank has committed to this on this website and
in its promotional material. It would be patent fraud not to forgive part of the
"acquisition price" on this basis of this whenever a prepayment occurred. In
other words, a prepayment of a murabaha to the University Bank will oper-
ate precisely as a prepayment of a loan would as a matter of contract and in
plain violation of the shari'a as enunciated by such luminaries as Averroes,
Zuhayli, Usmani and the Islamic Fiqh Academy.
If the bank truly wanted to reflect a voluntary undertaking of the sort
that Usmani described as narrowly permissible, it would have to phrase the
paragraph quoted above in the following manner:
7. Can I pay off my contract early? Is there a penalty for doing this?
We are not obligated under Shariah guidelines to collect less than the full
acquisition price and indeed we are prevented under Shariah guidelines
from guaranteeing or otherwise promising in any fashion that an early
payoff amount will reduce the full acquisition price. However, consistent
with Quranic encouragement to be kind to debtors, we may voluntarily
accept an early payment and forgive the portion of the acquisition price that
would correspond to a prepayment penalty in a conventional loan We may
also forgive less than this, or more, or forgive none of the acquisition price
at all, as the decision to forgive any amounts, while recommended by the
Qur'an, must be entirely voluntary on our part or it is Islamically invalid.
This would certainly be the type of rebate that was voluntary, though it is
also one that is contrary to applicable law unless the prepayment penalty rate
is disclosed. And if it is disclosed, it is hard to imagine many Muslim home-
owners wanting to own a home on such unfavorable market terms. Shari'a
compliance is, as the University Bank's own documents inescapably prove,
impossible if compliance with applicable U.S. law is to be achieved.
C. On the Acceptance of "Interest" as Profit
Prepayment is not the only obstacle that renders Islamic banking impos-
sible in the United States. More problems arise in the interest deduction for
... Home Financing Murabaha Frequently Asked Questions, UNIVERSITY ISLAMIC
FINANCIAL, http://www.myuifcom/faq-forms/home-financing-faq/murabaha-faq/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 12, 2014).
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mortgages. Under U.S. law, a homeowner may deduct any interest paid on a
mortgage from their income on their annual tax returns. 112 While a home-
owner could legally forgo this quite valuable home interest deduction, it
would render the Islamic home financing market dramatically uncompeti-
tive relative to its conventional counterpart. The market would not be sus-
tainable under those conditions.
In order for the homeowner to take advantage of the deduction, however,
the homeowner must be paying interest. In fact, the amount that the home-
owner deducts is precisely the amount that appears in Box 1 on Form 1098
issued by the Internal Revenue Service, which corresponds to "[m]ortgage
interest received by a payer(s)/borrower(s)."113
The University Bank is aware of this, as is apparent from the following
excerpt from its "Frequently Asked Questions" section:
If there is no interest on the Murabaha transaction, will I still get a
1098-INT statement for income tax purposes?
As a financial institution, we are only able to show profit on the financing
of a home in one fashion. Thus we will issue a 1098-INT which you may
choose to use to deduct from your taxes.
Though the bank is careful not to describe explicitly any payments made
by a homeowner as "interest," this deliberately elliptical answer necessitates
that conclusion, given that the Form 1098 makes absolutely clear that it is
calculating mortgage interest, not any other form of profit. Any given indi-
vidual buyer, of course, is free to take the deduction, or not, though this in
the end matters little.11 5 The bank's return is "interest" and is characterized
under United States law as "interest," whether or not a buyer wishes to de-
scribe it as such on the buyer's own tax return.11
This further adds to the woes of the Islamic bank that is seeking to oper-
ate on a shari'a compliant basis. The point of Islamic banking was to act as
an alternative to interest based finance based on profit and loss sharing.11 7
112 26 U.S.C.A. § 163(h)(3) (West 2013).
113 See IRS, FORM 1098 (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1098.pdf
(emphasis added).
114 Home Financing Murabaha Frequently Asked Questions, UNIVERSITY ISLAMIC
FINANCIAL, supra note 111.
115 It is hard to see why a buyer would not do so. Surely if a pious Muslim buyer finds a
tax form in her mail indicating she has paid interest over the course of the year and finds that
unobjectionable, she will likewise find a claiming of the deduction to be unobjectionable.
116 26 U.S.C.A. § 163(a) (stating a deduction shall "be allowed," but not mandating one
be taken); see also infra note 120 and accompanying text.
117 USMANI, supra note 34, at 162.
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When this proved to be difficult, the practice then at least claimed to be in-
volved in the buying and selling of assets. Rules on real estate ownership
largely stripped this possibility away, except for semantic niceties permitted
by the OCC respecting "apparent" ownership by virtue of "legal" title.118
In the context of the mortgage deduction, the Islamic bank does not even
have the comfort of semantics-it isforced to describe its profits as interest
to have any hope of remaining economically viable in the United States. 119
Finally, the requirement that Islamic banks abandon any semantic pre-
tense that they are involved in anything other than the issuance of commer-
cial loans at interest extends far beyond the mortgage interest deduction. The
Federal Reserve has issued a series of stringent disclosure rules-set forth
in Regulation Z and issued in furtherance of the Truth in Lending Act-to
which every lender must adhere when offering loans to consumers, includ-
ing home mortgages.120 The core of these regulations require disclosure to the
homeowner of the cost of credit-namely, the annual percentage rate and
the finance charge. 12 1 That is, the bank cannot engage in its core business
without describing to its constituency that it is not shari'a compliant.
D. Profit and Loss Sharing Between Bank and Depositor
We have seen that when making the bulk of their portfolio investments,
Islamic banks must disclaim any significance to the one element that distin-
guishes their credit mechanism from that of a conventional loan, namely their
purchase and sale of the underlying asset for which they are extending
credit.122 We have also seen that the banks must describe their profit as in-
terest, and that they must effectively treat it as interest for purposes of prepay-
ment, rather than as a purchase and sale. 123 This Article, however, has not
yet touched upon the greatest violation of the shari'a to which an Islamic
bank is subject under relevant financial regulation. This is the fact that, far
118 OCC Letter 867, supra note 81, at 8.
119 Unfortunately for buyer and bank alike, as Mann demonstrates in a thorough analysis
of the matter, it is far from clear that the IRS accepts the characterization of the bank's profit
amounts as deductible interest. Mann, supra note 6, at 1152-57. This creates a rather deli-
cious irony. For tax purposes, it may well be the Islamic bank and the Muslim homeowner
who insist that their transaction is interest based, while the IRS insists that, in fact, the bank's
profit is substantively different from that which attaches to a conventional financing and,
therefore, the buyer is not entitled to a deduction.
120 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.4 (2011).
121 Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Techniques ofMandatory Disclosure:
Socioeconomics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 199,
213 (2005).
122 See supra Part II.A.
123 See supra Part II.C.
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from sharing profits and losses, federal law and regulation, as set forth below,
effectively require Islamic banks to insure that bank depositors suffer no
losses at all under any circumstances. 124 This, of course, is precisely what
occurs with an interest bearing account.
To be defined as a bank under the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA),
an institution must meet one of the two criteria: either (1) the bank must be
federally insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), or
(2) it must both be in the business of offering commercial loans and it must
offer demand deposits, thereby enabling the depositor to withdraw the money
- - 125in the account at any time without prior notice.
The second of these criteria is not possible for an Islamic bank if it
wishes to be shari'a compliant because the bank is not engaging in the busi-
ness of making commercial loans. Indeed, the whole point of its existence is
to avoid the taking of interest, which is an inherent feature of commercial
loans.126 Moreover, because of the fear of a bank run each time that property
values drop, it is unclear whether a bank could tie up substantial amounts
of its funds in assets as illiquid and uncertain as ownership in real property
and still offer demand deposits. 127
In any event, the matter of compliance with the second criteria is largely
academic because the practice of offering FDIC insurance is so widespread
that, as a practical matter, it is hard to imagine a banking institution of any
significant size being able to operate without it.128 To the extent that those
seeking to expand Islamic finance in the United States are imagining Islamic
retail banks of significant size, they surely must be contemplating those with
national charters that are members of the Federal Reserve and thus have
FDIC insurance. 129Hence, University Bank, the only Islamic bank with de-
mand deposit services in the United States, is federally insured. 130
Moreover, government insured deposits are a cornerstone of financial reg-
ulation in the United States, and, indeed, in any jurisdiction with a mature
124 See infra Part II.E.
125 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(c)(1) (West 2013). Certain exceptions are offered under § 1841
(c)(2).
126 See USMANI, supra note 34, at 6.
127 See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 3, at 134.
128 See generally RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P.
MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 73-76 (4th ed. 2009) (de-
scribing the process for receiving regulatory approval to charter a bank).
129 A bank with a national charter by definition is a member of the Federal Reserve and
therefore has insurance from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Id. at 76.
130 Business Shariah-Compliant Profit-Sharing Savings Accounts, UNIVERSITY ISLAMIC
FINANCIAL, http://www.myuif.com/banking/business-shariah-compliant-profit-sharing-sav
ings-accounts/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
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financial system. 131 A bank regulator's primary concern is a bank panic
caused by nervous depositors who are aware that most of the funds of the
bank are engaged in assets, and who might therefore withdraw their funds
from a healthy bank while the bank still has liquid assets available for distri-
bution if others are doing the same. 132 The decision of one group of depos-
itors to do this would lead other rational depositors to do the same until the
bank would have no liquid assets. 133 This would result in a liquidity crunch
for the bank because it is unable to satisfy remaining demands despite having
substantial non-liquid assets (such as bank mortgages). 134 Bank default would
follow. The default of one bank might lead to panic among depositors in other
banks, resulting ultimately in a financial collapse. 135 There is, in this sense,
a certain instability in the financial system that requires attention.
Federal deposit insurance avoids this problem because it obligates the
government to pay the depositor back if the bank cannot somehow supply
the funds. 136 Thus, there is no reason for any rational depositor to "panic"
and withdraw its funds even if the bank finds itself in a difficult economic
situation. Government insurance, in other words, is the premier means used
by mature financial regulators to prevent a bank panic. 137
The stark variance with the shari'a thus becomes unmistakably clear. It
is true that an Islamic bank's portfolio investments have shifted from silent
partnership arrangements to credit sales and lease finances, as we have
seen.138 However, the bank deposits have remained structured in the form of
the silent partnership. 13 9 Few things are clearer in Islamic finance than that
131 Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical
Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645, 647, 649 (2012).
132 Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies,
73 VA. L. REV. 301, 307-08 (1987).
133 d.
134 Id. at 308.
135 Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank
Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 129, 160-62 (1986).
136 Fischel et al., supra note 132, at 313. As will be shown, the United States ordinarily
has hard dollar limits on the amount that the FDIC is obligated to insure per account. See
infra note 153 and accompanying text.
137 Government insurance is not the only manner in which bank regulation limits the
possibility of a liquidity crunch. The government also sets minimum capital requirements to
ensure that the assets of a bank exceed its liabilities by a minimum "cushion," thereby
avoiding the possibility of a loss to depositors. See supra note 131. Because this presents
no impediment to Islamic banks, I do not discuss it in the main text.
138 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
139 El-Gamal, supra note 32, at 126-27 ("Islamic banks have kept to the generally ac-
cepted principle of profit and loss-sharing ... in principle if not in practice. Thus, depositors
in Islamic banks do not earn any return on their deposits while those holding 'investment
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the rules of the silent partnership, consistent with the principles underlying
Islamic finance, require profits and losses be shared between the parties
thereto. 140 Indeed, the central objection that Islamic finance proponents have
been making for decades against the taking of conventional interest is specif-
ically that it does not permit sharing as between profits and losses as a proper
Islamic system would through mechanisms such as the silent partnership.1 4 1
It is thus hard to imagine a more central violation of the rules of the silent
partnership than one that permits a depositor to have back the full amount of
the deposit, even as the depositor's silent partner, the bank, with whom the
depositor was supposed to share all profits and losses, descends into bank-
ruptcy. It simply defies logic for an institution to provide for this, and for a
depositor to accept it, while still claiming to be adhering to the shari'a as
it has been understood in Islamic finance over the past half century.
E. Regulatory Accommodation?
Of course, the mere fact that there are obstacles to the creation of a truly
shari'a compliant Islamic bank does not mean on its own that such a bank
is necessarily impossible. After all, as the Introduction demonstrated, the fed-
eral government has undertaken extensive efforts at dialogue and engage-
ment with proponents and practitioners of, and experts in, Islamic finance. 142
Therefore, it is worth asking whether, by working together, Islamic finance
and U.S. banking regulators might find a way to a mutually satisfactory
accommodation. The answer, it seems rather plain, is no.
As an initial matter, there is the fact that despite all the dialogue and en-
gagement, there have been no significant accommodations made as to Islamic
accounts' earn a share of the profits and are exposed to potential losses.... On the assets side,
Islamic banks avoid the risks of profit and loss-sharing investment arrangements by engag-
ing mostly in cost-plus trading and lease financing.").
"' USMANI, supra note 34, at 38 (indicating that in a silent partnership, or even an ordi-
nary partnership, "[a]n investor/financier must share the loss incurred by the business to the
extent of his financing."). See also M. UMER CHAPRA, TOWARDS A JUST MONETARY SYSTEM
68 (1985) ("Islam requires profit-and-loss sharing in an equitable manner, whereby the finan-
cier shares in the losses, if any, in proportion to the capital in the business, if he wishes to
have a share in the profit."); SIDDIQI, supra note 44, at 11; Seif I. Tag El-Din, Towards
Optimal Risk Management for Profit-Sharing Finance, ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON WEALTH
CREATION 188, 189 (Munawar Iqbal & Rodney Wilson eds., 2005).
141 Chapra, for example, objects to interest because it relieves the financing party of any
obligation to concern itself with the success of the venture it finances. See Chapra, supra
note 34, at 4. This is in contrast to Islamic finance's partnership vehicles, which encourage
profit and loss sharing. See also Mirakhor & Zaidi, supra note 39, at 49; Tag El-Din, supra
note 140, at 189 (citing references offering supposed economic benefits of profit and loss
sharing mechanisms such as the silent partnership).
142 See supra Introduction.
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finance since 1999.143 Surely, if mutually acceptable solutions could be
found, the players would have at least found some of them by now.
That said, some of the simpler and more straightforward problems might
be addressed. It is not impossible to envisage a revised Regulation Z, for
example, that does not require an Islamic bank to disclose to a potential
borrower an effective "interest" rate, but perhaps instead an "Islamic bank
profit rate." As with the 1999 OCC interpretive letter, which describes the
asset purchases that are part of a murabaha as nominal and the risk profile
as being functionally equivalent to a commercial loan, 14 4 the relevant dis-
closure would have to indicate something similar. It could state, for example,
that the Islamic rate of return in the agreement is a guaranteed rate, that the
consumer will be forced to pay it, and that the consumer undertakes the same
risks, rights, and obligations with respect to this transaction as any borrower
would on any interest-bearing loan. The accommodation, in other words,
would be semantic, but would at least avoid the problem Islamic banks and
borrowers face when being required to describe their returns as "interest."
Whether federal regulators would want to go through the necessary time and
expense of amending relevant regulatory rules to accommodate a practice
of relatively limited size is a separate matter, but at least from a theoretical
perspective, a solution is not difficult to contemplate.1 4 5
The matter of the interest deduction presents greater difficulties if we
assume, as seems reasonable, that Congress will not repeal the home mort-
gage interest deduction at any point in the near future. 146 Islamic banks will
143 1999 was the year that the OCC issued its second interpretive letter permitting the
murabaha under certain strict conditions notwithstanding prohibitions against real estate
ownership. See discussion supra Part II.A.
1" OCC Letter 867, supra note 81, at 2.145 According to a 2010 study, there are approximately 2.6 million Muslims who are
"adherents" of congregations. Ass'n of Statisticians of Am. Religious Bodies, Maps and
Charts for 2010, in 2010 U.S. RELIGIOUS CENSUS: RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS &
MEMBERSHIP STUDY, available at http://rcms20lO.org/maps2OlO.php?seldenom=267
&sel map%5B%5D=4&confirm-confirm (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). Although the number
of Muslims is almost certainly larger, it would be fair to assume that, overwhelmingly,
Muslims who did not belong to any congregation would be less religious and therefore less
interested in Islamic finance opportunities. This renders the potential size of the Islamic
finance market relatively small in the United States. In addition, regulators could be con-
cerned that any single accommodation might very well lead to demands for more accom-
modation from other faith based communities. Regulators might thus avoid the effort on
this ground alone. In any event, this Article does not address comparatively less significant
practical concerns surrounding accommodation of Islamic banking, but rather the broad
conceptual reasons federal regulation could not possibly accommodate the practice as a
general matter.
14 James A. Fellows, The Mortgage Interest Deduction: The Tax Court Brings Clarity,
41 REAL EST. L.J. 338, 338 (2012) (describing any attempt to repeal the deduction as
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have to jettison the shari'a and describe their profits as interest to enable
homeowners to take advantage of it, as the University Bank currently does." 7
It may seem at first glance that the IRS could issue a private letter or reve-
nue ruling that resembled the OCC letters of 1997 and 1999 by indicating
that some of the more common instruments deployed in Islamic finance re-
semble interest in economic substance, and that the IRS will treat them as
such. However, this is not so simple.14 8 Specifically, it will be difficult to
issue a ruling that is of sufficient generality to be of use to Islamic banks,
while not creating a series of additional problems relating to what consti-
tutes debt for tax purposes in broader settings. 149 This is to say nothing of
even knottier problems relating to even more complex tax issues ranging
from depreciation to passive activity loss rules.150 Hence, one prominent
commentator stated that were he the IRS, he would seek to know as little as
possible about these religious-based transactions.15 1 The IRS appears to
have heeded the advice.
No obvious solution arises as to prepayment either, where the shari'a
violation requiring a corresponding reduction in principal seems unavoid-
able and quite serious. However, it is in the area of deposit guarantees where
the impossibility of Islamic banking is by far the most apparent. For it is as
anathema to shari'a to guarantee a silent partnership against loss, as it is im-
portant to federal regulators that such insurance be firmly in place. On this
matter, the United States is moving in the opposite direction from Islamic
finance, particularly after the financial crisis of 2008, as demonstrated by the
"political suicide" akin to eliminating benefits such as Social Security and Medicare). To
be clear, many have articulated sound reasons that Congress should eliminate the home
mortgage deduction. Some have argued that by incentivizing debt secured by a mortgage over
investment in real estate, the deduction has encouraged homeowners to overleverage. See
Rebecca N. Morrow, Billions of Tax Dollars Spent Inflating the Housing Bubble: How
and Why the Mortgage Interest Deduction Failed, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 751,
754-60 (2012). Others point out that the deduction is regressive, and favors those both
wealthy enough to afford a home and with a significant enough income to have higher mar-
ginal tax rates. See Anthony Randazzo & Dean Stansel, Unmasking the Mortgage Interest
Deduction: Who Benefits and By How Much?, REASON FOUNDATION (July 28, 2011), http://
reason.org/studies/show/the-mortgage-interest-deduction. For a particularly interesting ad-
ditional objection relating to discrimination against Muslims and others who do not believe
in taking interest, see Mann, supra note 6, at 1166. The point for these purposes, however,
is that irrespective of the merits of repeal, the deduction is likely to remain for some time
to come.147 See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
148 See Joel S. Newman, Islamic and Jewish Perspectives on Interest, 89 TAx NOTES
1311, 1316-18 (2000); Mann, supra note 6, at 1160-65.
149 Mann, supra note 6, at 1163-65.
15o Newman, supra note 148, at 1318.
151Id.
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enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act.152 Among the many things the Act does is increase the deposit insur-
ance available per bank account to $250,000, from $100,000.153 During the
height of the crisis and through 2012, the FDIC-insured qualifying bank
deposit accounts were without limit.154
Of course, the financial sector's troubles in the recent financial crisis
related much more to troubles at investment banking outfits undertaking ex-
cessive risk than to depositor panic at traditional banks.1 55 However, since
the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, investment banking and commercial
banking have often operated within different divisions of the same conglom-
erate bank holding company. 156 In light of this, federal regulators and Congress
seem to have found it necessary to increase limitations on deposits, without
limit when the crisis was particularly acute. This was precisely to avoid the
problem becoming worse through depositor panic as investment banking di-
visions in bank holding companies found themselves in increasingly difficult
circumstances.1 5 7 It is unimaginable that these same regulatory bodies and
Congress will not only reverse themselves, but also provide exceptions to
the very principle of insurance merely to accommodate Islamic banking.
Even the United Kingdom, a veritable hub of Islamic finance,15 8 is not
willing to offer much accommodation. The United Kingdom's premier finan-
cial regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), will not countenance
a deposit account subject to lOSS.159 Instead, with respect to only one Islamic
bank, the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB), the FSA will merely permit the
depositor to absorb a guaranteed loss if it chooses to do so at the time of the
152 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
153 Id. § 335, 124 Stat. 1540 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E)) (defin-
ing the maximum amount of deposit insurance as $250,000); Fischel et al., supra note 132,
at 312-13 (referring to earlier limit of $100,000).
154 12 C.F.R. § 330.16(a) (2013).
155 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, CONCLUSIONS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY COMMISSION, xviii-xx (2011), available atfcic.law.stanford.edu/report/conclusions.
156 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102 § 101, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(repealing sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 78, 377)); Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-
Leach-Bliley, 25 J. CORP. L. 691, 709, 715-16 (2000).
151 See supra note 156.
158 Theodore Karasik, Frederic Wehrey & Steven Strom Islamic Finance in a Global
Context: Opportunities and Challenges, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 379, 389 (2007) ("London has be-
come the largest international center for Islamic finance outside the Muslim world .... ").
159 MICHAEL AINLEY ET AL., ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE UK: REGULATION AND CHAL-
LENGES, FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY 14 (2007), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other
/islamic-finance.pdf.
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loss and not earlier.160 In other words, the JBB must insure against losses and
must offer the depositor the return of the deposit in the event of losses. 161
The legal requirements are precisely what they would be as to a conven-
tional bank and an unambiguous repudiation of shari'a as articulated by
Islamic finance. However, the FSA has indicated that "after the event"-
meaning after it becomes necessary to pay the depositor back his full deposit,
notwithstanding the bank's loss-the depositor has the right to decline the
repayment and accept the loss for its own account.162
Despite the broad praise given to the FSA accommodation among student
commentators,163 its rather limited scope should be apparent. The approach
seems to permit the depositor to comply with shari'a vis-a-vis the deposit,
though it is hard to see how the deposit could be said to lie in an Islamic bank.
Plainly, as an institution, the JBB is consciously and overtly violating shari'a
on its own terms by offering insured deposits in the first place, and, one must
presume, honoring their terms when depositors demand it.
Moreover, it is hard to understand precisely what kind of accommodation
it is to permit someone not to accept money being offered to them. Presum-
ably, the depositor would have the "right" to decline compensation for its
deposit loss any time it pleased, simply by not cashing the FSA check is-
sued to it, or rewiring the money to whatever account it came from. Finally,
it should be noted that the FSA took pains to emphasize that it was not in-
tending to establish a general precedent for Islamic banks, that others might
not be given the same dispensation, and that each case would be evaluated on
its own merits. 164 It is hard to describe the accommodation as anything more
than a gesture, of little real importance. That it has proven successful, not-
withstanding its legal meaninglessness, helps to explain why it is that Islamic
banking has proven so appealing to Muslim consumers and depositors, not-
withstanding its patent impossibility. The next section addresses this matter
in much greater detail.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION
A. Islamic Banks and Muslim Belonging
Based on the foregoing, a devout Muslim in the United States has very
little reason to consider engaging in retail Islamic banking if the motivations
160 Id.
161 d.
162 Id.
163 See, e.g., Billah, supra note 6, at 1090-92; Shah M. Nizami, Note, Islamic Finance:
The United Kingdom 's Drive to Become the Global Islamic Finance Hub and the United
States'Irrational Indifference to Islamic Finance, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 219,
229-30 (2011).
164 AINLEY ET AL., supra note 159, at 14.
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for doing so are viewed only through the narrow prism of obedience to reli-
gious doctrine. This is not only because the Islamic bank does not engage in
very much profit and loss sharing, but also because the risk profile of the in-
struments it uses in order to engage in Islamic finance must be "identical"
to those offered by a conventional mortgage in order to be legal. 165 And it is
not only the fact the bank's ownership of the asset, in which it claims to be
trading, is transitory at best, but also the fact that even transitory ownership
carries no beneficial interest and merely creates the "appearance" of owner-
ship, with recordings on deeds resembling those of a conventional mortgage
entirely. 166 Third, it is not only that the bank routinely treats its resale price
as including accruing interest, forgiven when principal is repaid, but also
because it legally obligates itself to do so.1 6 7
These are only the beginning of the doctrinal problems, as we have seen.
The homeowner also ends up taking an interest deduction on something the
industry has gone to great lengths to claim is not interest,168 and the bank
discloses on a government required form that it is interest and what the rate
of interest is. 16 Finally, and perhaps worst of all, depositors are protected
against loss, obliterating any notion of a profit and loss sharing partnership
as between them and the Islamic bank and plainly violating the most basic
rules of such partnerships as set forth in the manuals of Islamic finance. 170
In light of this, it might be fair to ask precisely why there is so much
comparative interest in expanding the scope and size of such highly compro-
mised institutions. A Muslim who truly found the taking of interest to be the
prohibited riba of the Qur'an-deeply abhorrent, akin to theft, and a cause
for divine punishment in the manner described in the Qur'an 17 -would
probably be better counseled to avoid banks altogether than to do business
with Islamic banks of this sort. Options do exist for such a person. At one end
of the spectrum, the rules of the National Banking Act concerning real estate
ownership do not apply to savings and loan institutions or credit unions, for
example. 72 Credit unions are also exempt from the definition of "bank"
165 OCC Letter 867, supra note 81, at 3.
166 Id. at 8; OCC Letter 806, supra note 100, at 1.
167 See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
168 Mann, supra note 6, at 1151-52.
169 Edwards, supra note 121, at 213.
170 See discussion supra Part II.E.
171 The Qur'an likens the prohibited practice of riba, which Islamic finance associates
with the taking of interest, to theft. See THE HOLY QUR'AN 4:161 (A. Yusuf Ali trans.,
1975) [hereinafter QUR'AN] (promising a painful punishment for those who take riba and
those who devour the property of others falsely). It elsewhere indicates that those who have
engaged in the practice and do not repent and desist from what they have done are among
the denizens of hell. Id. at 2:275.
172 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 29 (West 2013) (limiting the prohibition to "national banking
associations").
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under the National Bank Holding Company Act. 173 If the (still substantial)
regulations corresponding to these institutions nevertheless prove burden-
some, some more committed members of the community might leave the fi-
nancial system entirely and rely on informal networks to finance their homes.
They might choose to invest their money in the equity markets, where profit
and loss sharing is enerally the norm, and where regulation hence presents
less of an obstacle. 4 Yet none of these alternatives-seemingly doctrinally
more attractive-has appeared to dampen the enthusiasm for a more prom-
inent Islamic banking presence in the United States.
To understand this demand better, we must look beyond doctrine and
consider broader explanations. Specifically, we must consider whether the
Islamic bank is offering something else of value to the American Muslim,
even if it is plainly not offering compliance with the shari'a under the stan-
dards set forth by the industry. In fact, it is doing that. The Islamic bank gives
the Muslim believer an institution of her own, as a mosque permits her a
place of her own within a broader American fabric. That there will be a se-
vere doctrinal compromise is, in this context, beside the point. What is im-
portant is the institution is Islamic "enough," bears sufficient features to be
identifiable as driven by shari'a, even if not, strictly speaking, shari'a com-
pliant, and that it is legal, meaning the U.S. legal regime confers some legit-
imacy on it and, afortiori, on those Muslims engaged in business with it.
Much of the material extolling the benefits of Islamic banks seems to be-
tray the salience of this underlying desire. Typical are remarks made in 2005
173 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(c)(2)(E) (West 2013).
174 See Moghul, supra note 60, at 470-71. It is important to note, however, that the
equity markets provide problems of their own given the extent to which economic activity
is integrated in the modem world. Specifically, it would be nearly impossible to find any
investment where interest was entirely absent from its activities. Michael J.T. McMillen,
Asset Securitization Sukuk and Islamic Capital Markets: Structural Issues in These
Formative Years, 25 WIS. INT'L L.J. 703, 728 (2008). A salient example might be an equity
investment in a massive office complex in which one tenant was a bank with a single ATM
machine. Though the amount of money received from the bank by virtue of a single ATM
lease would de minimis, if one took a prohibition on interest in an absolute fashion, then the
investment in the entire office complex would be prohibited. Id. at 727 (offering such an
example). To deal with this problem, religious scholars active in the area of Islamic finance
have developed what is known as the "Dow Jones fatwa " permitting equity investment in
ventures so long as certain conditions are met that help to ensure that the return on interest
in any given transaction is not significant. See id. at 728-29. Moreover, to comply with the
fatwa, an investor must "purify" any amount of any return that is interest based by remov-
ing it from the portfolio (and presumably giving it to a charitable cause). Id. at 729. Needless
to say, there is a significant difference between a person who finds interest to be abhorrent
still countenancing de minimis engagement with interest out of practical necessity, and one
who conducts business with an Islamic bank that regularly and substantially violates shari'a
on a daily basis in a manner described in the main text.
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by Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., then the Executive Vice President and General
Counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.17 5 While describing in
some detail the efforts made by United States regulatory authorities to ad-
dress the challenges presented by Islamic banks, Baxter made reference on
two separate occasions to the "long and cherished history of religious free-
dom in the United States." 176 He further indicated this freedom included a
state obligation to ensure enforcement of the laws "does not interfere un-
duly with the religious practices of members of our body politic, including
Muslims."1 77 To be blind to Muslim needs in the area of Islamic banking
would be to act as "enemy" to the United States Constitution, which, Baxter
indicates, quoting Chief Justice Burger, "affirmatively mandates accommo-
dation, not just tolerance of all religions, and forbids hostility towards any."1 78
To fulfill such accommodation, Baxter concludes, "we will need to continue
to exhibit the creativity and flexibility that the OCC showed in approving
the ijara and murabaha financing products." 179
Yet, as discussed in the Introduction and Part II, federal regulators have
done virtually nothing to accommodate Islamic finance since 1999, nor is it
clear they could do very much substantively even if they wanted to. Surely,
by 2005 the General Counsel to the New York Federal Reserve knew this
and yet still found it important to extol not only the virtues, but indeed the
obligation of the United States' accommodation of the Muslim population
through facilitation of Islamic finance.180
This leads to the second, even more telling, problem that lies in Baxter's
remarks. In his laudable eagerness to demonstrate Muslims had a place in
the American fabric, and the Constitution required that legislators and regu-
lators accommodate Muslim interests and practices, the General Counsel to
the New York Federal Reserve misstated the law.
First, there is the fact that the Burger quote to which Baxter makes refer-
ence is inapposite. Burger's insistence on "affirmatively mandated accom-
modation" was in the context of a decision concerning the Establishment
Clause and, specifically, over the constitutionality of a nativity scene, which
a municipality wanted to place on public grounds.181 The question Baxter
poses, however, is not whether regulators are permitted to accommodate
Islamic finance if they choose under the Establishment Clause, as was the
175 See Baxter, supra note 7.
176 See id.
177 See id.
178 See id. (quoting Chief Justice Warren Burger).
179 See id.
180 See id.
181 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
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case with respect to the nativity scene, but whether they must under the Free
Exercise Clause. Is it an obligation of the nation's institutions to find a way
to make room for Muslims (as well as adherents of other religions, of course)
through accommodating them in the general legal and regulatory framework?
Burger's dicta may suggest this is so, but since that decision was issued, and
long before Baxter made his comments, the Supreme Court ruled directly
otherwise.182 In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court held the
state does not have the "affirmative[]" constitutional obligation to accom-
modate religious practice under the Free Exercise Clause when it makes law
(or regulation).183 A neutral, generally applicable law is per se immune from
constitutional challenge on Free Exercise grounds. 18 4 It is only when the law
is made with the intention of discriminating against religious practice that it
is unconstitutional.18 5
In other words, the United States Constitution does not mandate that
banking regulatory authorities do a single thing to accommodate Islamic
banking within the regulatory scheme so long as the regulations were not
themselves issued with the purpose of discriminating against Islamic bank-
ing. Religious animus is not a reasonable or fair description of the reasons
for the regulations described in this Article. The requirement that interest
rates be disclosed in home financings, for example, is undertaken to permit
consumers to make informed decisions when taking on debt. 186 The reason
that bank accounts must be insured against loss is to prevent bank runs.187
Home interest deductions are permitted so as to encourage home owner-
ship.188 The burden on Islamic finance in each case is incidental. Baxter's
comments are entirely wrong as a legal matter: regulatory authorities may
be as "willfully blind" as they wish to the religious implications of their
rulings in these contexts and not run afoul of the U.S. Constitution.
The better legal claim is a statutory one-namely, that the Congress en-
acted a law known as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which
does prevent federal government agencies from imposing a substantial bur-
den on religious exercise unless there is a compelling state interest to do
so.189 Baxter chose not to indicate that a failure to accommodate was illegal,
182 Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
183 Id.
1s' Id. at 879.
15 See id. at 878.
186 Edwards, supra note 121, at 210.
17 Fischel et al., supra note 132, at 313.
s Mann, supra note 6, at 1146-47.
189 See Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 578
(1998) (criticizing RFRA for failing to offer justification for the extension of its scope to
the federal government).
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but rather, that it ran contrary to the Constitution. Based on the Court's
rulings, Baxter's statement simply is not true.
But to say as much is to miss the point. General Counsel Baxter's speech
was not about legal niceties or the interpretation of Supreme Court precedent.
It was about the place of Muslims in American society, made at a time when
the United States was deeply involved in two wars in Muslim countries,190
the standing of the United States in the Muslim world was extremely low,191
and a culture war regarding the place of Muslims in American society had
just begun to brew. 192 And how much more compelling, how much more
authoritative, how much more powerful a demonstration of compatibility be-
tween Islam and America could exist than for a leading lawyer to call the
Constitution to one side to support the Qur 'an on the other? How better to
locate a Muslim in America than to tell that Muslim not only is Islamic bank-
ing accommodated, but also it must be; not because of a law passed by the
Congress in 1993 which was mostly invalidated, 193 but because the nation's
founding document, in which its highest ideals are articulated demands it?
Having established this ground, how much more important than to carry
through, how understandable the insistence that more be done to actually
expand Islamic banking in the United States, because this is what Constitu-
tion and Qur'an demand? The inconvenient facts respecting the impossibility
of Islamic banking are shunted aside in deference to these powerful social
190 In 2005, the United States had troops both in Iraq and in Afghanistan and was con-
ducting active combat operations in both. Alan McLean & Archie Tse, American Forces in
Afghanistan and Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive
/2011/06/22/world/asia/american-forces-in-afghanistan-and-iraq.html?_r-0.
191 Richard A. Clarke, No Returns: Why More Democracy Won't Mean Less Terrorism,
N.Y. TIMEs MAG., Feb. 6, 2005, at 20 (referencing low standing of the United States in the
Muslim world based on numerous opinion polls).
192 While much of the more heated rhetoric regarding the place of Islam and Muslims
in America erupted after the announcement to open a Muslim community center in lower
Manhattan in August of 2010, the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks did lead to an outbreak of
reported hate crimes against Muslims and the creation of a counterterrorist apparatus that
was largely directed at Muslims. See, e.g., Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet:
Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America, 47 GoNz. L. REv. 429, 432-33 (2011)
(describing the counterterrorist focus on members of the Muslim community); William B.
Rubenstein, The Real Story of U.S. Hate Crimes Statistics: An Empirical Analysis, 78
TUL. L. REV. 1213, 1235 (2004) (describing the rise in hate crimes against Muslims after
the 9/11 attacks).
193 As originally envisioned, RFRA was supposed to constrain the states and thus effec-
tively overrule Smith on the question of the deference to be given to religious practice by
neutral laws. Lupu, supra note 189, at 581. This was explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court
in City ofBoerne v. Flores, where the Court held Congress could not determine the mean-
ing of the Free Exercise Clause to the derogation of the Court's own interpretation. City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
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and cultural forces, in favor of religious freedom and cultural accommodation
on the side of the regulators, and from a desire for belonging on the side of
American Muslim adherents. To do otherwise-to suggest that federal law
and applicable regulation will not and cannot tolerate Islamic banking-
sounds positively intolerant in such a milieu. And few in the United States
wish to find themselves portrayed as such.
B. Islamophobia and Islamic Finance
As the previous section indicates, it is plainly true that few within the
United States would seek to describe themselves as intolerant. Yet it is
equally clear there are significant forces that view Muslims and Islamic
practices as a threat to the core fabric of the United States and very much
include, and indeed target, Islamic finance as part of this effort. 194 This sec-
tion demonstrates that the core objections of this movement against Islamic
finance relate far more closely to Muslim presence in the United States than
anything having to do with Islamic finance on its own terms.
But in the process of demonstrating this, it is important to point out the
fundamental quandary that an adherent to a view of Islam as an existential
threat to the United States faces. In most cases, such an adherent will almost
surely resist the description of intolerance as much as anyone else. Still it is
hard to avoid the charge while appearing to engage in an effort to denigrate
the world's second largest religion and its 1.6 billion followers. 195
Therefore, it is somewhat important to such adherents to be understood to
be attacking some sort of totalitarian political movement rather than a reli-
gion. This was the premise of the opposition to the building of a mosque in
Murfreesboro, Tennessee. 196 The appeal of this premise is perfectly obvious.
If Islam is a religion, then to oppose the building of a mosque in Tennessee
is to engage in religious bigotry, but if Islam is a totalitarian ideology, then
the opposition to an Islamic center seems far more principled. The effort in
Tennessee ultimately failed, and the mosque did open.197 However, the mat-
ter received enough attention and consideration to lead to the extraordinary
decision of the United States Department of Justice to file an amicus brief
194 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
195 Drew Desilver, World's Muslim Population More Widespread Than You Might
Think, PEw RESEARCH CENTER (June 7, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013
/06/07/worlds-muslim-population-more-widespread-than-you-might-think/.
196 Bob Smietana, Legitimacy ofMosque at Heart of Tenn. Mosque Suit, USA TODAY
(Oct. 4, 2010, 12:48 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/2010-10-05-mosque
04 ST N.htm.
197 Brown and Hauser, supra note 30, at A9.
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in what should have been nothing more than a zoning dispute. 198 The pur-
pose of the brief was to clarify to the Tennessee Chancery Court that the
position of the United States is "uncontroverted" and broadly held across
all levels of the government-Islam is a religion and thereby entitled to be
treated as such.199
In any event, even without the Department of Justice intervention, this
sort of attack has its limitations. It is difficult to describe Christianity and
Judaism as religions and then deny the same status to a creed whose central
belief is that God spoke through the Angel Gabriel to Muhammad, who had
been chosen by God as Prophet as the Prophets of Israel before him.200 It
is more common to move the discourse away from Islam and Muslims and
onto shari'a. At one level, the description of shari'a as a totalitarian ideology
is equally inane: the problem with rendering shari'a into legal code is not that
it is excessively rigid, but rather it is too pluralistic, encompassing jurists from
different schools of thought who come to quite different conclusions on par-
ticular matters.201 Yet there are elements relating to shari'a that render it, on
balance, fertile ground for a movement seeking to deny Muslims a place in
the United States. Shari'a is relatively unknown, giving those seeking to char-
acterize it as a threat the opportunity to define it as they wish. In this regard,
the foreign name helps to fortify a sense of menace, an outside presence
threatening to disrupt the American way of life. The corpus of the shari'a
202
was derived primarily in medieval times, by jurists with medieval world-
views. As such, it included some limited number of elements, among them
harsh criminal punishments,203 which are easy to describe and, of course, dis-
tort. There are Muslims abroad who seem almost eager to help the Islam-
204
ophobic cause, making a spectacle out of such punishments. Finally, the
198 See Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae, Estes v. Rutherford
Cnty. Reg'1 Planning Comm'n, No. 10cv-1443 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Oct. 18, 2010), http://www
justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/murfreesboro-amicus_10-18-10.pdf.
199 d. at 1.
200 M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari'ah: Sources, Interpretation, and
Rule-Making, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 135, 147-48 (2002).
201 It is for this reason one of the earliest Western scholars of Islamic law, the inestima-
ble Joseph Schacht, described the codification of the shari'a as a distortion of it. Joseph
Schacht, Problems of Modern Islamic Legislation, 12 STUDIA ISLAMICA 99, 108 (1960).
202 Sherman A. Jackson, Shari'ah, Democracy, and the Modern Nation-State: Some
Reflections on Islam, Popular Rule, and Pluralism, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 88, 94
(2003); cf Hamoudi, supra note 45, at 430, 433 (describing adherence to classical doc-
trine in modernity as more rhetorical than real).
203 RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: THEORY AND
PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 56, 60, 65 (2005).
204 John Burns, A Fittingly Gory Finale to a Sordid Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14,
2001, at A4; Adam Nossiter, Refugees Escape Hard-Liners From North, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
2012, at Al.
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shari'a is the "way" for religious Muslims to live their lives,205 constituting
the body of rules and norms they follow in carrying out their religious obli-
gations. Given these facts, it is easy to describe large numbers of Muslims,
including American Muslims, as threatening because they claim to be de-
voted to shari'a, and to demonize shari'a as nothing more or less than the
caricature its opponents have made of it.
Under this highly reduced and broadly inaccurate conception of shari'a,
gone are the primary rules of shari'a, which Muslims most often consider
and which they rely on in their daily lives-those of worship and diet, includ-
ing how and when to pray, fast, give alms, and make a pilgrimage, or what
foods to eat and what to consider sinful.206 Instead, for example, one pro-
posed legislative text seeking to deny Muslims status in the United States
stated that the shari'a is not the "way" for Muslims, but rather a "legal-
political-military doctrine."207 Those who follow it are not "Muslims" but,
cleverly, "sharia-adherent's [sic]," 20 8 as if there were a way to adhere to
Islam that disregarded shari'a. The goal of shari'a adherents, as mandated
by shari'a, is to "actively and passively support the replacement of America's
constitutional republic," 20 9 to abrogate, destroy and violate the constitution
through violence and criminal activity,210 and to replace it with "the estab-
lishment of a political society based upon sharia [sic]." 2 11 Little wonder that
those who espouse such a view, among them Newt Gingrich, describe shari'a
as "a mortal threat to the survival of freedom in the United States and the
world as we know it."212
Given this background, the opposition to Islamic banking becomes
clearer. It is part and parcel of opposition to shari'a, which is in and of itself
an attempt to deny Islam and Muslims the same space afforded to other reli-
gious followers. Hence, Gingrich's statement of shari'a as a mortal threat
was made directly in reference to his opposition to Islamic finance.213
205 Asifa Quraishi, What if Sharia Weren't the Enemy?: Rethinking International
Women's Rights Advocacy on Islamic Law, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 173, 203 (2011).
206 See COULSON, supra note 30, at 12 (pointing out that most of the rules from the
Qur'an deal with ritual and worship and not "law" as understood in modernity).
207 S.B. 1028, 107th Gen. Assemb., sec. 1, § 39-12-902(2) (Tenn. 2011).
208 Id. sec. 1, § 39-13-902(3).
209 Id. sec. 1, § 39-13-902(5).
210 Id. sec. 1, § 39-13 -902(8).
211 Id. sec. 1, § 39-13-902(4).
212 See Michael Gerson, Sowing the Wind: Gingrich's Simplistic Fight Against Sharia,
WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2011, at A29 (quoting Newt Gingrich).
213 Justin Elliott, Newt: For Shariah Law Before He Was Against It, SALON (June 8,
2011, 10:01 AM), http://www.salon.com/2011/06/08/newt gingrich muslims/ (quoting Newt
Gingrich). It is not clear whether Gingrich actually believes such nonsense, or whether his
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Alternative objections to Islamic finance, to the extent they are raised,
are so implausible they only help to demonstrate the underlying motivation.
Many, for example, have alleged Islamic finance is a vehicle for funding
terrorists. 2 14 To believe this one would have to think the instruments em-
ployed to conduct artifice in Islamic finance-by such global institutions such
as HSBC, Citibank, and AIG2 15-are so enticing to terrorists that they would
prefer them to other means of currency transfer, which routinely avoid any
reporting requirements at all.216 More likely, the objection is not actually
to Islamic finance, but rather to the supposed threat, terrorist or otherwise,
posed by Islam and Muslims.
Other fears respecting Islamic finance are even more bizarre but still en-
tirely consonant with the same fear of shari'a as contagion. Hence, there is
the suggestion that Hassan Banna, the founder of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood, promoted Islamic banking so Islamic banks might penetrate
and overtake the conventional finance sector.217 Banna died in 1949.218 The
first Islamic banks did not begin in earnest until the 1970s. 2 19 There is no
sensible connection between the two of them.
More centrally, however, the irony of the claim is that it has matters
entirely backwards. Islamic banks have done absolutely nothing to affect the
manner in which the global economy operates. Rather than being the means
to penetrate and overtake conventional finance, as Part II and this Part have
shown, Islamic finance has conceded to the dominance of conventional
Muslim baiting is a form of shameless demagoguery. It is clear that in the past Gingrich
was quite supportive of the Muslim community in the United States. Id.
214 See Eman El-Shenawi, Islamic Finance is Unclear to Many, Perception Continues
That it's Still Linked to Terrorism, AL ARABIYA (July 4, 2011, 5:09 AM), http://www
.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/07/04/155960.html.
215 HSBC has an Islamic finance desk, as does Citibank. See Important Notice, HSBC
AMANAH, http://www.hsbcamanah.com/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); Introduction to Citi
Islamic Investment Bank, CITIBANK, http://www.citibank.com/ciib/homepage/aboutus/intro
.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). Concerning the involvement of AIG in Islamic finance
products, see infra this section.
216 Most prominent among these are the hawala, informal currency transfer networks
generally used by diaspora communities to send money to relatives at home but easily abused by
those seeking to avoid the more elaborate record keeping of licensed banks. See Rachana
Pathak, The Obstacles to Regulating the Hawala: A Cultural Norm or a Terrorist Hotbed?,
27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2007, 2009, 2018 (2004).
217 Rachel Ehrenfeld & Samuel A. Abady, Islamic Banking, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 11,
2008), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/1 1/islamic-banking/.
218 Tariq Ramadan, Op-Ed., Wither the Muslim Brotherhood?, N.Y. TIES. (Feb. 8,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/opinion/09iht-edramadanO9.html?pagewanted
=all& r-0.
219 TIMUR KURAN, ISLAM AND MAMMON: THE ECONOMIC PREDICAMENTS OF ISLAMISM
xi (2004).
146 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
220finance, much to the consternation of its own proponents. Or, put differ-
ently, Islamic banks and Islamic financial institutions have assimilated,
violating their own rules in order to find a way to get along.
We thus have a rather confusing phenomenon. Those who view shari'a
as a foreign menace that may penetrate and overtake the United States resist
those financial institutions that assimilate and accept, at every level including
the semantic, the rules of conventional finance to the derogation of Islamic
doctrine. When considered from the perspective of the underlying suspicions
of Islamic finance as part of a Muslim threat, however, this is not so pecu-
liar. The doctrine pertaining to Islamic banking is no more relevant to the
Islamophobic elements in American society than constitutional law doctrine
was particularly important to General Counsel Baxter. The point is not legal
and doctrinal consistency. The point, rather, is to portray the enemy, wherever
found, as antithetical to what one holds dear, be it the Constitution, repub-
lican values or the American way of life, and to keep him there.
There are numerous other examples, indeed there are websites whose sole
purpose appears to expose the supposed dangers that arise from Islamic
221banks and Islamic finance. More instructive for purposes of this Article,
however, might be an example of the means by which such Islamophobic
elements seek to deploy U.S. legal doctrine in service of this broader aim of
eradicating recognized Muslim space in America. To date, the most legally
sophisticated attempt to restrict Islamic finance was in the case of Murray v.
Geithner, and it was not terribly sophisticated.222 The issue concerned the
marketing by the insurance giant AIG through its subsidiaries of an Islamic
insurance product known as the takaful, from which AIG earned 0.022 per-
223
cent of its revenue in 2009. Formally, the basis of the suit was that the
U.S. government violated the Establishment Clause when it offered AIG bail-
out funds pursuant to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) because
224
of AIG's investment. That is to say, the United States government impermis-
sibly advanced the religion of Islam by supporting AIG, which supported
takaful, and indeed was earning twenty-two-thousandths of one percent of
its revenue from it.
220 See, e.g., USMANI, supra note 34, at 16, 23.
221 See, e.g., SHARIAH FINANCE WATCH, www.shariahfinancewatchorg/blog/ (last visited
Jan. 12, 2014).
222 Murray v. Geithner (Murray l), 763 F. Supp. 2d 860, 868-69 (E.D. Mich. 2011). The
case was decided in favor of the government, and appealed to the Sixth Circuit as Murray v.
Dep't of Treasury, where it was affirmed. Murray v. Dep't of Treasury (Murray II), 681
F.3d 744, 753 (6th Cir. 2012).
223 Murray I, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 869.
224 Id. at 864.
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The Establishment Clause claim was weak, assuming the Plaintiff even
had standing to raise it. As such, it was dismissed at both the District Court
level on the grounds that funding AIG through TARP was not a violation of
the Establishment Clause,225 and at the Sixth Circuit on the grounds that the
226Plaintiff lacked standing. On its own, this is not interesting. More inter-
esting is the worldview of the Plaintiff and his legal team, as revealed in the
confounding and incoherent positions taken by them in the summary judg-
ment motion and on appeal. The positions clearly reveal the matter had al-
most nothing to do with religion-state entanglements or the niceties of Islamic
finance doctrine. 22 Instead, the real motivation for the suit stemmed from
a desire to deny specific space for Muslim accommodation because of the
threat that the opponents of Islamic finance believed Islam posed to the
United States.228
The doctrine was thus a distracting sideshow that the Plaintiff seemed
to find rather inconvenient to deal with. A quick review of the legal terrain
demonstrates why this is. Courts evaluate statutes for their constitutionality
under the Establishment Clause pursuant to the familiar Lemon test, first
articulated in the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman.229 Under that test, a statute
must (1) have a secular purpose, (2) not have a primary effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion and (3) not entangle the government excessively in
230
religion. Unfortunately for Plaintiff, this test offered no real opportunity
to examine Islamic finance on its own terms, as the test is designed to gauge
legislation on the basis of its connection to religion rather than the substance
of the religion to which it is so connected.
As such, the Plaintiff did not even seem to try to satisfy the Lemon test.
It would be quite difficult under any circumstances to show that the purpose
of the TARP program funding, when applied to AIG, was somehow moti-
vated by an Islamic purpose, rather than to save the financial system from
collapse. But surely a better effort could have been made than what the
Plaintiff put forth. Plaintiff merely asserted "a reasonable observer would
conclude that the government purchased AIG stock under the EESA with
the purpose of advancing religion because 'Defendants intended for AIG to
use federal funding to support all of its activities, including [Islamic finance],
225 Id. at 860.
226 Murray II, 681 F.3d at 747-48.
227 See generally id.; Plaintiff's Brief In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment,
Murray I, 763 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (No. 08-CV-15147).
228 See Murray II, 681 F.3d 744; Plaintiff's Brief In Support Of Motion For Summary
Judgment, Murray I, 763 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (No. 08-CV-15 147).
229 Lemony. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
230 Id. at 612-13.
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which Defendants favorably endorse."' 23 1 Surely such a cursory statement
requires substantial elaboration to be remotely plausible. The contemporary
media reports all related to a need to prevent major financial institutions from
failing and causing a wider panic that would force the credit markets to seize.
Islamic finance simply was not in the discourse. Yet, Plaintiff seemed will-
ing to rely on its cursory statement, and hence could not establish the first
prong of the Lemon test. 232
Plaintiff seemed similarly uninterested in establishing the second prong
233
of the test. One way to establish government aid to a private entity violates
the "effects" prong of the Lemon test is to show the aid supports religious
- - 234-indoctrination. This of course requires religious indoctrination to exist in
the first place, and then to show that the government's aid somehow furthered
that indoctrination.235 AIG is not a not-for-profit institution, such as a church
or a parochial school.236 As such, it could, and did, offer evidence to dem-
onstrate it was not interested in religious messaging at all and that it did not
237deliver its products with religious instructions or indoctrination. Instead, its
mission in delivering these products, which in the end account for a minis-
cule part of its revenue, was to earn greater profits from those who wished
to purchase them, and it was uninterested in the religiosity and indeed the
religious affiliation of its purchasers.238
To this the Plaintiff offered only that Defendant's claims were "over-
whelmingly contradicted by the undisputed evidence and warrant[] no fur-
ther response." 2 39 This is a rather unorthodox method of persuasion during
summary judgment and prompted a rebuke from the District Court.240
Similarly, Plaintiff did not seek to show that whatever government aid
existed supported Islamic finance products. In fact, Plaintiff did not even try
to demonstrate how much of AIG's business was involved in the marketing
of such products, or how much revenue it derived therefrom. 24 1 For all of
this, seemingly crucial to win an Establishment Clause claim, the Plaintiff
supplied only cursory or conclusory statements as its "evidence." 242
231 Mlurray I, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 866 (emphasis omitted).
232 d.
233 Id. at 866-74.
234 Id. at 867.
235 d.
236 Id. at 868.
237 Id. at 868-69.
238 Id. at 868.
239  d.
240 Id. at 868-69.
241 Id. at 869.
242 Id. at 868-69.
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Instead, Plaintiffs evidence related solely to the supposed danger that
Islam in general and Islamic finance in particular presented to the United
States, and the extent to which it needed to be utterly exterminated.243 Ob-
viously, this is legally irrelevant to Plaintiff's claim as a legal matter. Yet, of
course, it was the entire point of the effort.
Hence, for example, the Plaintiff submitted as evidence all of the
activities that the Treasury Department had engaged in, described previously
in Part I, including attending, sponsoring, and hosting Islamic finance work-
shops and seminars, instituting a scholar in residence program, and posting an
article on its website offering an overview of Islamic Finance.244 With one
exception all of these activities preceded the initiation of the program.245
For that reason alone, the District Court dismissed the evidence.246
Plaintiffs other evidence came in the form of expert testimony, which
was not brought to prove relevant elements of Plaintiff s claim, including that
TARP had a religious purpose, Islamic financial products constituted per se
indoctrination, they were a fundamentally important part of AIG's business,
or the government sought to support those products in particular when dis-
bursing TARP funds.2 Instead, Plaintiffs experts had negative testimony
about Islamic finance and the threats it presented by way of support for ter-
rorism and jihadism, but little as to what any of that had to do with AIG's
products or the government's support for AIG through TARP.248 Neither
the District Court nor the Circuit Court seemed to be interested in even dis-
cussing this testimony given its near total irrelevance.24 9 The notion that an
Establishment Clause violation could be sustained based on how "bad" a
religion is alleged to be is too ludicrous to be taken seriously.
Even the Plaintiffs standing claim, accepted at the District Court level
but rejected on appeal, was more indicative of the culture warrior than one
actually interested in winning the case. The Plaintiff's articulated harm was
243 Id. at 866, 868, 873-74.
244 Id. at 873. The Court also held these activities did not present any sort of endorse-
ment of religion, but were merely designed to promote dialogue and increase awareness of
Islamic finance and not actively proselytize in its favor. This was upheld on appeal, where
the Sixth Circuit described the same evidence used to support Plaintiff s claim that TARP
contemplates support for religious activities to be "unconvincing to say the least," charac-
terizing the actions of the relevant government institutions instead as "a few scattered
bureaucratic activities." Murray II, 681 F.3d 744, 753 (6th Cir. 2012).
245 Murray I, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 873-74.
246 d.
247 Id. at 868.
248 See Affidavit of Plaintiff Expert Stephen C. Coughlin, Esq., Murray I, 763 F. Supp.
2d 860 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (No. 08-15147); Affidavit of Plaintiff Expert Robert Spencer,
Murray l, 763 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (No. 2:08-cv-15147-LPZ-MKM).
249 See generally Murray II, 681 F.3d 744; Murray I, 763 F. Supp. 2d 860.
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that he was a Marine veteran, a devout Catholic, and a taxpayer harmed by
TARP's bailout of AIG because this promotes "shari'a law." Shari'a law,
according to Plaintiff, is part of a "global jihadist war against the West and
the United States" and "sends a message to Plaintiff, who is a [non-Muslim],
that he is an outsider." 250 Whatever the merits of Plaintiff s claims regarding
standing, it is difficult to see how they have anything to do with his feelings
of being an outsider in America on the basis of a U.S. government bailout
of an insurance giant.
In any event, the point is quite clear: this case was not really about the
Establishment Clause. It was merely a convenient front for the culture war,
a forum where those seeking to deny the Muslim her place in the United
States could hope to show the threats posed by shari'a, and specifically in
this context Islamic finance, were pervasive and deep-rooted in large public
and private institutions.
In sum, opposition to Islamic finance is merely opposition to Muslim ac-
commodation, in precisely the same way that rhetorical support for Islamic
finance is a form of expressed support for Muslim accommodation, notwith-
standing its absolute impossibility.
CONCLUSION: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL ISLAMIC FINANCE
The focus of this Article relates to particular reasons an Islamic bank in
the United States remains so broadly popular, notwithstanding its doctrinal
impossibility. Yet from this narrative springs forth potential explanations
for much broader paradoxes respecting the continued explosive growth of
251Islamic finance. My purpose is not to explore such considerations in depth
in this concluding section, as doing so would require a separate article, which
I hope to undertake in the future. Nevertheless, there is sufficient space here
to identify particular themes from the spread of global Islamic finance for
which there is an interesting parallel in the curious and simultaneous impos-
sibility of and desire for American Islamic banking that I have discussed in
the preceding sections.
Specifically, the strongest theoretical proponents of Islamic finance
have long extolled its attentiveness to peculiarly Islamic notions of fairness
252
and social justice in particularly strident language. Seemingly in broad
250 Murray II, 681 F.3d at 747.
251 On the scope of such growth to date, see Future Growth, supra note 38.
252 Three quite distinct Islamic figures, central to the development of Islamic economics,
refer repeatedly to notions of social justice and fairness in their descriptions of Islamic eco-
nomics, and in particular Islamic financial methods. The first of these, Muhammad Baqir
al-Sadr, the thoughtful Shi'i Iraqi jurist who authored a highly influential tome on Islamic
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agreement on this principle, the primary criticisms of Islamic finance from
academics, 253 religious scholars, 254 and Islamic finance insiders255 are that
it all too often mimics conventional finance rather than establishes an econ-
omy based in social justice as intended.256
To the extent this is true, it is also true that both within and beyond the
industry, experts have long suggested Islamic finance is doomed ultimately
to failure unless it were to improve its ways and achieve some measure of
economics, as well as the seminal intellectual contribution to the creation of an interest-free
bank in Islam, makes the point repeatedly in his writings. See MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL-
SADR, IQTISADUNA 58-63 (World Org. for Islamic Services trans., rev. ed. 2009) (describ-
ing social justice as one of the cornerstones of Islamic economics); see also MUHAMMAD
BAQIR AL-SADR, AL-BANK AL-LA RIBAWI Fi AL-ISLAM 6-7 (1973) [hereinafter AL-BANK
AL-LA RIBAWI Fi AL-ISLAM] (referring to a form of distributive justice as being a principal
objective of Islamic economics, and to the Islamic bank as being a key component of the
economic system). The same can be said for the militant Sayyid Qutb, whose influence on
radical Islamic movements remains vibrant. Bernard K. Freamon, Martyrdom, Suicide, and
the Islamic Law of War: A Short Legal History, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 299, 348-50
(2003). Finally, the highly influential Pakistani Islamist, Sayyid Abul a'la Maududi, describes
taking interest in almost Marxist terms, suggesting it increases maldistributions of wealth and
perpetuates class struggle. See SAYYID ABUL A'LA MAUDUDI, THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF
MAN AND ITS ISLAMIC SOLUTION 27-31 (Islamic Publ'ns 2d ed. 1966).
Nor is this perception limited to the revolutionary founders. Usmani, for example, repeats
Maududi's claim that the charging of interest leads to massive wealth disparities in contem-
porary Western societies. USMANI, supra note 34, at 11. Chapra states that a central objec-
tive of Islamic finance is to do justice, and that Islamic finance achieves this through both
requiring that a financier share in the risk of loss of an underlying venture, and that the poor
have reasonable access to financing. Chapra, supra note 34, at 9. See also Timur Kuran,
On the Notion ofEconomic Justice in Contemporary Islamic Thought, 21 INT'L J. MIDDLE
E. STUD. 171, 174 (1989) (noting the manner in which Islamic finance proponents ground
the injunction against interest in a principle of fairness).
253 El-Gamal, supra note 32, at 127; Hamoudi, supra note 4, at 94; Zaman & Asutay,
supra note 32, at 74.
254 In one notable example, in 2008, several dozen Deobandi scholars in Pakistan issued
a collectivefatwa against Islamic banking, at least partly on the grounds it did not hold to
the principle of profit and loss sharing but instead relied on vehicles that mimic, to quote
the fatwa, "precisely conventional banking." Shoaib A. Ghias, Juristic Disagreement:
The Collective Fatwa Against Islamic Banking in Pakistan, in CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC
FINANCE: INNOVATIONS, APPLICATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES 103, 107-08 (Karen Hunt-
Ahmed, ed. 2012). This was a particular embarrassment to Usmani, who after all is a Deo-
bandi himself and whose prominent role in contemporary Islamic finance can scarcely be
gainsaid. Id.
255 Hasan, supra note 33, at 11 (describing theory and practice as topics of frequent dis-
cussion at conferences on Islamic finance).
256 See Mehmet Asutay, Conceptualisation of the Second Best Solution in Overcoming
the Social Failure oflslamic Banking and Finance: Examining the Overpowering ofHomo-
Islamicus by HomoEconomicus, 15 IIUM J. ECON. & MGMT. 167, 172-73 (2007).
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social justice rather than exclusively engaging in nonsensical formalistic con-
*257tortions to mimic conventional transactions. The assumption underlying
such a prognostication is that Muslim consumers are not interested in Islamic
finance because it provides some sort of substantively empty rhetorical ges-
ture while undertaking the economic and legal equivalent of conventional
transactions. Rather, they are seeking an alternative economic paradigm be-
cause of broad dissatisfaction with the current global economic ordering and
they expect Islamic finance to provide it.258
Hence, with the unabated growth of Islamic finance, there is something
of a paradox that arises again in the global sphere. This is because Islamic
finance has hardly become more substantively distinct from conventional fi-
nance over the past several years, and there is much evidence that the exer-
259
cises in mimicry are increasing rather than the reverse. Yet at the same
time, Islamic finance has exploded in size, from U.S. $5 billion in 1982260 to
$200 billion in 2000,261 to $500 billion in 2008,262 to an estimated $1.8 tril-
lion by the end of 2013.263 If Islamic finance is supposed to represent a broad
- * 264-Muslim desire for an alternative economic arrangement, and if it is plainly
not doing that, whether because doing so is economically impossible or for any
26
other reason,265 then what explains the unimpeded growth of the industry?
257 See, e.g., Chapra, supra note 34, at 12 (arguing Islamic finance might not remain at-
tractive to "Muslim masses" unless it does a better job of realizing its vision); EL-GAMAL,
supra note 22, at 175-76 (indicating that while there are "moderate" opportunities for growth
for Islamic finance using current methodologies, "sustained, long term growth" requires a
different approach); Haider Ala Hamoudi, You Say You Want A Revolution: Interpretive
Communities and the Origins of Islamic Finance, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 249, 294 (2008)
(suggesting that "it is hard to see how Islamic finance could retain its legitimacy if it were
to abandon" its functional objectives).
258 Chapra, supra note 52, at 12; Hamoudi, supra note 257, at 294; EL-GAMAL, supra
note 22, at 176.
259 Asutay, supra note 256, at 173.
260IBRAHIM WARDE, ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1 (2d ed. 2000).261 Td.
262 Salah, supra note 37, at 138.
263 Future Growth, supra note 38 (citing Ernst & Young projection).
264 Some have challenged the idea that the Muslim public actually expects something
substantive out of Islamic finance, as opposed to narrow and formal adherence to doctrine
on its terms alone. See, e.g., VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 3, at 26 n.2. If this were true, then
the mimicking of conventional finance would be no more relevant than the fact that turkey
bacon "mimics" pork, and yet the former is permitted while the latter is not. I summarily
dismiss such claims here as wholly implausible. As has been explored in supra note 252, the
rhetoric in favor of the substantive benefits and social justice that Islamic finance provides
is so persistent and so widespread that it is difficult to compare to dietary rules or other formal
strictures, compliance with which represents little more than discharge of an divine obligation
265 Global Islamic finance is potentially different from the American Islamic bank in one
important respect: whereas the latter is clearly impossible under the current U.S. regulatory
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Political considerations well beyond the narrow confines of legal and reli-
gious doctrine again provide the answer. These considerations have become
particularly salient in the Muslim world over the past several decades, which
has seen a rise in the political movements referred to as "Islamist," meaning
for these purposes that they seek a more robust role for the shari 'a in public
266life. In many cases, governments that are not themselves Islamist will seek
267to invoke shari'a as a means to blunt the popularity of Islamist groups. For
any such government, Islamic finance proves particularly useful as a means
to demonstrate Islamic credentials without disrupting the existing political,
economic, and social order.
One of the premier states in which a secular government endorsed Islamic
causes because of Islamist competition is Malaysia.268 Specifically, beginning
in the 1970s, Malaysia's premier party, the UMNO, "co-opted prominent
Muslim leaders, created its own channels (and curtailed others) for Islamic
renewal and proselytization ..., strengthened state-provided Islamic education,
mandated Islamic rituals and discourse in public life, and bolstered Islamic
institutions of all sorts, from banks to universities."269 The UMNO took these
steps at least in part because of the rise in popularity of an Islamist competi-
tor known as PAS.270
The public support that has been devoted to Islamic finance as part of the
271broader Islamization effort is hard to overstate. It included measures such
banking system for the reasons discussed in Part II, one could not demonstrate in any sort of
conclusive fashion that it is "impossible" for a financial system to be built in a manner that
was truly centered on the principle of profit and loss sharing. Indeed, the disappointment felt
by both outsiders and insiders respecting the current practice of Islamic finance discussed in
this section seems premised on the notion that Islamic finance is somehow redeemable. In any
event, I will not burden this paper with the far more elaborate question of whether expect-
ing something different from Islamic finance is indeed possible, or rather is unrealistically
utopian. Compare Asutay, supra note 256, at 169-72 (arguing in favor of a utopian vision)
with Mahmoud El-Gamal, Rising Islamism and (Bad) Islamic Economics, ISLAM AND
ECONOMICS: RANDOM THOUGHTS ABOUT ISLAM, MUSLIMS AND ISSUES RELATED TO
ECON. AND FIN. (July 4, 2007, 9:16 AM), http://elgamal.blogspot.com/2007/07/rising-islam
ism-and-bad-islamic.html (suggesting that Islamic finance cannot be reformed unless it
abandons "historical" and "pietist" utopianism). Rather, the fact that Islamic finance has
seen exponential growth despite claiming to want to abandon its formalist approach
while failing to do so is paradox enough.
26 Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Death oflslamic Law, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 293,
295 (2010).
2 7 Malaysia is an excellent example of this phenomenon. Donald L. Horowitz, The
Qur'an and the Common Law: Islamic Law Reform and the Theory of Legal Change, 42
AM. J. COMp. L. 233, 243 (1994).
268 Meredith L. Weiss, The Malaysian State Turns 50 And the Nation?, 31 FLETCHER
FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 119, 120-21 (Winter 2007).
269 Id. at 121.2 70 Id.; See also Horowitz, supra note 267, at 243.
27 Horowitz, supra note 267, at 243.
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as encouraging local religious leaders to develop Islamic financial products
that resembled those of conventional finance, along with disapproval of and
distaste for obsession with finer points of religious doctrine in a way that
would inhibit the cause of Islamic finance.272 Government support also took
the form of direct financial and administrative aid, including the subsidizing
of research centers and universities to legitimize Islamic finance and Islamic
capital markets and the creation of a national shari'a board that would deter-
mine which Islamic financial practices were permissible and which were not
273throughout the nation. The ultimate result of this broad and extensive sup-
port was the establishment and fostering of a parallel banking system in
Malaysia that ran alongside the conventional financial sector, 27 one that
became a premier center for Islamic finance in the world.275
The other major area in which Islamic finance tends to operate within the
Muslim world is in the Arab Gulf, and specifically those nations that com-
prise the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).276 Here, again, the support offered
to Islamic finance, derived ultimately from the extensive oil wealth in the
region, began in the 1970s, precisely when criticism was on the rise respect-
ing the perceived decadent and squandering ways of the Arab oil sheikhs.277
Saudi Arabia, a state that is "notoriously sensitive" to any accusations re-
specting its Islamic legitimacy, led the effort.2 78 Such accusations, after all,
undermine the very political legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy, which relies
on the support given to it by a deeply conservative religious establishment.279
The other GCC states have Islamist movements of their own to contend
with, making their support for Islamic finance as a means to blunt Islamist
power equally sensible. The major political opposition force in Kuwait, for ex-
ample, is Islamist in its orientation. 80 The United Arab Emirates is concerned
enough about Islamist opposition as to hold show trials in order to send dozens
of Islamists to prison, notwithstanding the predictable criticism this generates
281from prominent human rights groups. Qatar's emir is notoriously adept
272 WARDE, supra note 260, at 125.
273 Id. at 125; see also Weiss, supra note 268, at 121 (describing support for universities).
274 WARDE, supra note 260, at 123.
275 EL-GAMAL, supra note 22, at 112.
276 Id at 112. The Gulf Cooperation Council consists of six Arab states: Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Member States, THE
COOPERATION COUNCIL FOR THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF (2012), http://www.gcc-sg
.org/eng/indexc64c.html?a ction= GCC (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
277 KURAN, supra note 219, at xiii.
278 d.
279 Am Elizabeth Mayer, Conundrums in Constitutionalism: Islamic Monarchies in
an Era of Transition, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 183, 185-86 (2002).
280 Goldenziel, supra note 3, at 27.
281 UAE Islamists Convicted for Plotting Government Coup, BBC NEwS (July 2, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23142248 (describing trial of Islamists for a
coup plot and criticism of the trial by human rights groups).
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at using Islamism to bolster his own political legitimacy. Finally there is
Bahrain, with its explosive combination of a Sunni monarchy and a Shi'a
majority population,283 where a need by the leadership to legitimize itself
given the circumstances is both patently urgent and blatantly obvious.
Quite notably, however, Islamic finance and Islamic economics served,
and continue to serve, the uses of the GCC states and Malaysia as a means to
bolster Islamic credibility only if they are not truly revolutionary. In other
words, where the founders of Islamic economics in the middle of the previous
century advocated and agitated for political and economic revolution, 2 84 the
state benefactors of Islamic economics two decades later in the 1970s very
much sought to transform that revolution into something altogether more
compliant. Hence, they were as responsible for directing Islamic economics
and Islamic finance as they were in suf orting it. Saudi Arabia helped nar-
row the focus of Islamic economics, and Malaysia's premier Mahathir
Mohammad directed support to clerics and proponents who supported his
own modernist ideas while curtailing dissenting voices.2 86 This trend did not
alter the revolutionary rhetoric of Islamic finance as being a source of social
287-justice and wealth redistribution, nor was it intended to. But quite plainly
it altered the practice of Islamic finance, from one advocated by forces of
revolution to what is now practiced by international financial giants such
as Citibank 2 88 and HSBC, 2 both of which have Islamic finance desks.
Having been so thoroughly compromised, it is hard to imagine Islamic fi-
nance poses any sort of threat to the prevailing political, social, and economic
order that the GCC states and Malaysia seek to preserve. Of course, it also
will not do much to help Muslim societies deal with their severe economic
problems, 290 but this was never the point of the support offered to it anyway.
282 Barnard Haykel, Qatar and Islamism, NORWEGIAN PEACEBUILDING RESOURCE
CENTRE (Feb. 2013), http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow site/storage/original/applica
tion/ac81941dflbe874ccbda35e747218abf pdf.
283 Marina Ottoway, Bahrain: Between the United States and Saudi Arabia, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE (Apr. 4, 2011), http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/04/04
/bahmin-between-united-states-and-saudi-arabia/2tzk (indicating Bahraini population is 65
percent Shi'i currently).
284 Hamoudi, supra note 257, at 250. ("Despite its currently conservative character,
the modern practice of Islamic finance lies on a bedrock of social, cultural, and economic
revolution.").
285 KURAN, supra note 219, at xiii-xiv.
286 Weiss, supra note 268, at 120-21.
287 See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 3; supra note 252 and accompanying text (noting
continuing influence of social justice rhetoric within Islamic finance industry).
288 CITI ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK, http://www.citibank.com/ciib/homepage/index
.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
28 HSBC AMANAH, http://www.hsbcamanah.com (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
290 See, e.g., Asutay, supra note 256, at 172-75 (noting "social failure" of Islamic finance
in achieving broader economic objectives); EL-GAMAL, supra note 22, at 190 (arguing
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The point was to demonstrate Islamicity while not forcing major economic or
political disruption, and in this, Islamic finance has succeeded magnificently.
Interestingly, the same factors will likely lead to broader support and ex-
pansion of Islamic finance in years to come. This is because, ironically, many
political movements grounded in principles of religious conservatism find
themselves in something of the same predicament as the ruling governments
that have long sought to suppress them. Recently, for example, Islamist par-
ties have been able to lead governments following electoral victories, and in
particular following the Arab Spring .291 The movements that have come to
power in this way are hardly radical or revolutionary.292 In fact, they gener-
ally seek to downplay or ignore more radical manifestations of contempo-
rary shari'a implementation for fear that to advocate for such things would
be electorally damaging.293 The movements thus insist they adhere to values
of human rights, freedom of speech, democratic politics, the separation of
powers, and equality under the law, irrespective of race, origin, gender, or
that Islamic finance is inefficient and fails to provide substantive economic value to its
consumers).
29 1 For example, in Tunisia, the Islamist Ennahda has formed a ruling coalition with
smaller secular parties. Carlotta Gall, Tunisia Faces More Anger as an Ambush Kills Soldiers,
N.Y. TIMEs (July 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/world/africa/tunisia-faces
-more-anger-after-soldiers-die-in-attack.html. Iraq's current government is also Shi'a Islam-
ist in orientation. Reidar Visser, The Iraq We Are Leaving Behind: An Unstable, Divided
Land, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2011, at A43. Finally there is Egypt, where the Muslim Brother-
hood took power for a brief period of months after decades of effort, only to be deposed in a
military coup that took place at the end of June of 2013. Nathan J. Brown, Where Does the
Muslim Brotherhood Go From Here?: Reckoning With Morsi's Failure, NEW REPUBLIC
(July 3, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113762/egypt-coup-mohamed-morsi
-out-muslim-brotherhood-disarray.
292 This is not to deny the existence or importance of radical Islamist movements that
have come to power through coup, insurrection, or revolution and incorporated the harsh
criminal penalties developed in medieval times and referred to as the hudud. Some particu-
larly notable examples include the radical Islamist takeover in Mali, the rule of the Taliban in
Afghanistan, post-revolution Iran, and the hudud ordinances of Pakistan. See supra PETERS,
note 203, at 158-64 (Pakistan and Iran); AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN 93 (2000) (Afghanistan);
Sudarsan Raghavan, Malians Vote in First Presidential Election Since Coup, WASH. POST
(July 28, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/malians-vote-today-in-crucial-elec
tions/2013/07/28/c4c49458-f78f-11e2-a954-358d90d5d72d story.html. The point here,
however, is that the movements grounded in some notion of Islamic conservatism that
have taken power in states as varied as Turkey and Egypt, and that challenge ruling par-
ties in a state such as Malaysia, do not espouse such notions. Hamoudi, supra note 45, at
445-46; Christopher Fernandez, Impossible to Have Hudud, FMT NEWS (May 5, 2013),
http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/opinion/20 13/05/05/impossible-to-have
-hudud/ (describing the intent of the primary Islamist party in Malaysia to implement
hudud as "non-existent").
293 Hamoudi, supra note 45, at 445-46.
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even creed.294 At the same time, of course, such parties are Islamist and need
to demonstrate some deference to traditional understandings of the shari'a to
appeal to their more conservative base supporters if nothing else.295 If they
did nothing but speak of peaceful transfer of power through elections, su-
premacy of the law, and equality of all citizens under law, then there would
be little to distinguish them from secular and liberal parties.
As it did with the states of the GCC and Malaysia, a commitment to Is-
lamic finance fits the needs of Islamist parties perfectly. In its compliant and
compromised form, support for Islamic finance is unlikely to alienate even
the most hardened secularist, so long as the state does not go so far as to
mandate it-an exceedingly unlikely and radical step for a moderate Islam-
ist movement to take.296 And, to satisfy religious conservatives, Islamic fi-
nance shows commitment to something that is at least rhetorically Islamic
and sounds in the forms of classical Islamic jurisprudence.297
Hence, Iraq's highly divided legislature recently enacted a law forming
its own state-chartered Islamic bank, the Islamic Bank of Mesopotamia, be-
cause Islamists wanted to demonstrate a commitment to shari 'a.298 For their
part, secular groups thought it was pointless to object to the establishment of
294 A particularly salient example is Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, whose 2011 party
platform emphasized values from freedom of religion to separation of powers to peaceful
democratic transition. Where the platform mentions shari'a, it generally does so at such a
high level of abstraction it is very difficult to know what it meant by the reference. See FJP
2011 Program on Freedoms and Political Reform, FREEDOM & JUST. PARTY, http://www
.fiponline.com/article.php?id= 197 (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
295 See Nathan J. Brown & Amr Hamzawy, The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood: Foray Into Political Integration or Retreat Into Old Positions?
(Carnegie Papers, Middle E. Series, No. 89 (2008), available at http://carnegieendow
ment.org /2008/01/14/draft-party-platfon-of-egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-foray-into-polit
ical-integration-or-retreat-into-old-positions/3gej (describing tensions for Brotherhood in
seeking to navigate between satisfying more stalwart members and appealing to a broader,
more moderate public). This is by no means limited to Egypt. Iraq, for example, has a number
of Shi'i Islamist parties that compete with one another, thereby making a complete aban-
donment of any shari'a claims a significant political liability as more devoted and religious
members can easily transfer their loyalties to a competing political party. See Haider Ala
Hamoudi, The Real Electoral Crisis in Iraq, ISLAMIC L. IN OUR TIMES, (Jan. 23, 2010,
5:11 PM), http://muslimlawproforg/2010/01/23/the-real-electoral-crisis-in-iraq.aspx.
296 Hamoudi, supra note 45, at 445.
297 See EL-GAMAL, supra note 32, at 2 ("Islamic financial forms are derived, albeit
loosely, from classical sources of Islamic jurisprudence, which process of derivation gives
the industry its 'Islamic' label.").
298 The Law of the Islamic Bank of Mesopotamia, No. 95 of 2012; Caleb Pittman,
Iraq's Islamic Bank and the Islamicity ofInterest Forum, JURIST (Jan. 14, 2013), http://
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a bank with a paid up capital of U.S. $43 million,29 a fraction of the size
of Iraq's two largest conventional banks.3 00
Another salient example is Tunisia, where the ruling Islamist Ennahda
party has repeatedly insisted that the imposition of shari'a is not part of its
301--political program. Yet of course, Ennahda is an Islamist party, and it relies
on support from a base that wishes to see a broader role for shari'a in public
life. It could lose that base to more conservative elements if it disavowed
shari'a entirely.302 Again, Islamic finance fits Ennahda's purposes perfectly,
a fact that became obvious when its Prime Minister announced in June of
2012 an intention to make Tunisia a hub for Islamic finance.303 This broad
effort has led most recently to a parliamentary vote to authorize a sovereign
issuance of a form of Islamic bond known as the sukuk, thereby both en-
abling the state to encumber itself with potentially unpopular foreign debt
while simultaneously advancing the cause of mild Islamic revivalism. 304
None of this demonstrates a lack of sincerity on the part of the many
participants in global Islamic finance any more than the American Muslim,
or the American federal regulator for that matter, is being insincere in ex-
pressing a desire to see more Islamic retail banking take place in the United
States. For the most part, it is fair to assume that the participants want what
they have expressed an interest in promoting, and are not cynically hiding
ulterior motives.
The point, rather, is that in examining what they want by way of Islamic
finance globally, and American Islamic retail banking particularly, there lies
exposed a fundamental doctrinal incoherence. No purely formal legal analysis
can explain away that incoherence. To understand Islamic banking, we must
look beyond the law. When we do that, and only when we do that, can we
make any sense of the industry.
299 jd.
300 Cabinet Decides to Support the National Product and Increasing the Capital of the
Rifadain and Rasheed, AL-BAGHDADIAN NEWS (May 15, 2012, 6:26 PM), http://albagh
dianews.com/economy/item/9442-LvkYO-AkNeEAs-njEE-DIL-AkLlbv-AkNZn-NenAD
%D8%/oA9-EaYOLAk-LZHEJn-AkEAJDnl-NAkEyonD.html (describing capital of Rafi-
dain and Rashid banks as being between $250-$350 million each).
301 See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick Islamists Head Toward Victory in Tunisia Vote,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, at Al (describing Ennahda and its candidates as focusing on
econonic issues and security rather than moral concerns). Scott Sayare, Tunisia is Uneasy
over Party oflslamists, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2011, at A9.
302 See Tarek Amara, Tunisia's Islamic Finance Push Has Political Echoes, REUTERS
(Oct. 10, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/10/tunisia-islamic-finance
-idU SL6E8L2ESJ20 121010.
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304 See Tarek Amara, Tunisian Parliament Approves Sukuk Bond Issues, REUTERS
(July 18, 2013, 5:21 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/18/tunisia-sukuk-idUS
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